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This study analyzes the conceptual design of a joint tactical anti-jam com-
munication link from a systems point of view. It addresses the requirements
and the specifications for a communication system providing an integrated
solution for navies operating in closed-sea areas under intense enemy jam-
ming activity.
The concept of the proposed system is based on spread spectrum tech-
nology and on the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
Spread spectrum technology has been an area of extensive research for many
years. Satisfactory practical solutions have been provided through the imple-
mentation of several frequency hopping systems that give partial answer to the
anti-jam (AJ) problem. JTIDS is the only hybrid spread spectrum system in-
tended to provide a catholic answer. The AJ performance of the proposed
system is examined theoretically under realistic scenarios.
System feasibility, from the overall cost standpoint, is evaluated using life
cycle costing and sensitivity analysis. The trade-off between the procurement
of an original system and a JTIDS-based design is also evaluated, based on
the possible research costs. It is assumed that acquisition or procurement of
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I. CONCEPTUAL MODEL DESIGN
A. INTRODUCTION
Tactical communications are essential to carrying out joint military oper-
ations. Furthermore, the tactical communication links must be secure as well
as robust in the face of countermeasures. The establishment of anti-jam com-
munication systems is particularly desirable in the case of navies which oper-
ate in closed sea areas under intense omni-directional jamming conditions
where rapid, timely, secure, and survivable communications are required.
This thesis proposes a conceptual model design for an anti-jam communi-
cation system, based on the JTIDS (Joint Tactical Distribution System), for na-
vies which operate in closed sea areas and environments of this nature. The
operational considerations and the technical specifications in employing and
deploying such a system are analyzed in this chapter. The theory of anti-jam
(AJ) systems is presented in Chapters II and III. The analysis of the proposed
system's engineering design and its subsequent testing under jamming con-
ditions is described in Chapter IV. Chapter V is dedicated to the development
of a model for a life cycle cost analysis of the system. The author's conclu-
sions are presented in Chapter VI.
B. BACKGROUND
The need for tactical communications has been traditionally seen within
the framework of each particular service of the Armed Forces. Even within the
same service, differing needs and varying tasks have created a "mosaic" of
equipment. This diversity led to the development and implementation of totally
incompatible systems.
The lack of interoperability is primarily felt in joint operations where vari-
ous communication platforms operate in a common area and serve a common
task. Joint operations by their very nature imply complexity and task diversity.
Since the operational requirements of the individual units, weapon systems
and command levels have been traditionally met through diverse engineering
solutions, interoperability among them remained far from reality. Inefficient
use of these resources is a natural result.
Only recently, navies have started looking at the need for communication
within the context of Naval C3 (Command, Control and Communications) ar-
chitecture. Command and Control by definition are concerned with those
functions that aim to "the direction and control of general-purpose forces in
accomplishment of the mission" [Ref. 1: p.3]. A commander is able to perform
these functions in a timely fashion using communications. Communication
serves as the backbone of the overall C3 architecture. A more technical ex-
amination of the elements of this architecture leads to an appreciation of the
communication systems' vital role. A proper C3 architecture must be designed
to solve the interoperability problems for all its three dimensions.
Generally speaking, a C3 system is a closed loop process which contains
the following basic operations : Sense-Process-Classify-Evaluate-Plan-Decide
and Act (S-P-C-E-P-D-A) [Ref. 1: p. 4]. This generic process appears at every
level of command. A wide range of sensors available to the commander pro-
vides the necessary environmental information. This is then processed
through the system manually or automatically by ADP (Automatic Data Proc-
essing) stages, correlated with other events, filtered and finally displayed
suitably to an evaluator. At the planning phase the information is multiplexed
with existing doctrines and several alternative operational plans are devel-
oped. The decision making phase selects one alternative which becomes an
operational order. This is communicated to the assigned assets and an action
is taken. The effects of this action on the external environment are monitored
and the results are fed back to the system for control purposes. This closes the
loop. This process is shown in Figure 1. Typically the need for communication
occurs at least twice in a single looping rotation: to gather the environmental
information and to communicate decisions to the forces.
Whether an action is an actual application of a remote weapon system, a
rapid redisposition of assets, or a tactical maneuver, all actions require timely





Figure 1. The Command and Control Process: A control system model
showing the basic operations from sense through act [Ref. 1: p. 4].
technologically feasible solutions for a survivable, secure, reliable, fast and
interoperable C3 system. In the same manner, communication systems which
serve as the ears, the eyes and the mouth of this integrated system must pos-
sess the features mentioned above.
C. NAVAL TACTICAL OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
Joint tactical operations in closed sea areas require timely, accurate and
secure responses and actions. This task can be served by the availability and
efficient integration of all the resources needed.
1. The C3 Fundamental Elements
Three distinct categories of elements enter into the C3 architecture.
These are the naval command element, the naval forces element and the
functional element connecting the previous two. In the joint tactical arena the
command element includes the operational command centers at all levels,
supporting the Fleet Commander-in-Chief down to the unified or the individual
platform commander for a given area of operations. Generally, the mission is
to direct the naval forces available to perform two main naval functions, sea
control and power projection. The forces element includes all the resources
available to the naval commander, such as surveillance units, shipborne
weapon systems, ships, shore-based aircraft assigned to naval operations,
and amphibious forces that support the mission. The generic C3 model can be
thought in terms of a nodal network, as in Figure 2. A sequence of four nodes
representing one shore based and three shipborne command centers is
shown. These centers are the General Staff Command Center (GSCC), the
Fleet Command Center (FCC), the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) and
the Combat Information Center (CIC). An integrated tactical communication
system serves as the interface among these command centers which in turn
support the operational commanders by providing information processing,
storage, display and communication capabilities.
2. Description of the C3 Elements
A typical command center interfaces with various information sources
through this communication linkage and provides the respective commanders
with multi-source and fully correlated information, extending their information
availability beyond the force's sensing limits. An integrated network of infor-
mation collection, formed by over-the-horizon surveillance sensors and the
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Figure 2. C3 Nodal Representation: A model showing the communications
interface among the command centers.
overall tactical picture for every command level. This picture is the end prod-
uct of a filtering process which actually occurs at the respective command
centers.
The vital role of communications prevails when looking at the needs
of the naval commander. The requirements for real-time two way communi-
cation among the intraforce and beyond the horizon sensor-platforms, and the
constant monitoring of them within the context of a C3 system, should not be
limited in any way. For instance, the commander-at-sea needs to be able to
combine a sonar contact on a surface ship with a MAD (Magnetic Anomaly
Detector) contact of a surveillance/reconnaissance MPA (Maritime Patrol Air-
craft), to identify a possible submarine position (POSSUB). The coordination
of air, sea and land forces involved in joint naval operations is a rather com-
plex task due to the interoperability issues resulting from the diverse policies,
procedures and hardware used. Since policies are not firm, only the proce-
dures and the hardware can be uniformly incorporated into the naval C3 ar-
chitecture. This architecture then can essentially gather under its umbrella all
the technological developments for the achievement of compatible solutions.
Since the naval assets generally operate beyond the horizon, long C3
paths exist. These may require relay communication nodes to provide inte-
grated connectivity for all the forces assigned to a particular mission. The na-
val C3 system essentially serves all command levels from the joint tactical
commanders down to the unit and platform commanders by enabling them to
exercise their authority over the naval forces in the performance of their func-
tion [Ref. 2: p.2].
A typical operational scenario depicting joint naval operations is shown
in Figure 3.
The next task is to specifically define where this scenario may apply
and what the practical problems are.
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A typical geographical closed sea area in which the previously analyzed
scenario applies conceptually, is shown in Figure 4. Several assumptions are
made at this point:
• The C3 system's survivability is threatened by the existing
omnidirectional jamming capabilities of the enemy forces.
• The enemy capability of signal interception and message exploitation is
considered high.
• The friendly naval task force consists of a variety of air, sea and ground
military forces and shore based C3 complexes, in a mixture of command,
control, fighting and surveillance roles.
• Secure and fast responses of the joint task force can be challenged by the








Figure 3. Typical Operational Scenario: A variety of air-sea and land assets
involved in joint operations.
• Certain UHF spectrum availability exists for the accommodation of sys-
tem's operation.
• Existing technology transfer barriers is not an issue since it is beyond the
scope of this study.
What is required in this limited tactical arena is a joint tactical communi-
cation system which will serve as the backbone of the naval C3 architecture in
the following manner:
• By providing an integrative linkage among the command centers and the
forces involved, for effective coordination.
• By assisting the battle information management process through surviv-
able, secure and real-time communications, for reliable operation exe-
cution and within realistic times before any effective enemy action.
• By establishing a platform-to-platform non nodal connectivity among the
forces involved, for enhanced survivability in case that a central node is
lost or damaged.
• By satisfying multiple link voice and data handling requirements.
• By providing such functions that can support the integration and common
reference of precise tactical positioning and location of the assets, as well
as identification for the avoidance of mutual interference.
Figure 4. Example of a Closed Sea Area: A typical closed sea area of joint
operations.
• By allowing for compatible connectivity with existing equipment used for
the same purposes.
• By providing affordable solutions through the use of suitable technolog-
ical options or possible alternatives, concerning procurement or leasing.
Before any solutions are proposed to this problem, employing sophisti-
cated and advanced techniques and "state-of-the-art" technology, a more
technical approach to the analysis of the naval C3 architecture is necessary.
This will ease the translation from abstract operational considerations into
more specific technical requirements.
E. ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL C3 CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE
1. Historical Factors
The rapid evolution of modern weaponry in the field of naval warfare
constantly reduces the reaction times of a joint tactical naval force, especially
when it operates in limited geographical sea-areas. The need for timely deci-
sions drives the development of an integrated C3 conceptual architecture.
Joint naval task forces are directed by those command centers coordi-
nating a range of surveillance sources and weapon systems. The functional
connectivity of these elements forms a conceptual C3 model. Several param-
eters enter into the C3 model and define its requirements. Naval doctrines,
plans, policies and missions when coupled with the projected threat form the
operational requirements [Ref. 3: p. 9]. These in turn dictate the C3 architec-
ture, which includes:
• The functions needed to achieve the stated objectives.
• The structure within which these functions are performed.
• The connectivities within the structure and the interfaces with the external
entities for the command, control and information exchange.
2. Description of the C3 Process
The C3 closed loop process serves all command centers, by rotating
the environmental information acquired by the surveillance assets and sen-
sors. The C3 process as previously described filters the information through
the S-P-C-E stages before the commander of a particular command center ini-
tiates plans, makes decisions and initiates the appropriate action. Although
ADP is used extensively, human interface occurs at the evaluation phase and
occasionally at the process and classification phases. Planning and decision
making are eased by the use of existing doctrines. Ultimately the selected
action is communicated through operational orders to the action performers.
Halushynsky and Beam state that decisions can be implemented either by the
delegation of authority to subordinate commanders, by the direction of a sub-
ordinate commander to carry out a selected action through an operational or-
der, or by exercising direct control over subordinate assets. The loop closes
by continuously sensing the results of the actions taken. Data exchange takes
place at the "Process" and "Evaluate" stages. The evaluator correlates the in-
formation processed and received from both horizontally and vertically related
command levels through a communication link. This link provides connectivity
among remote sensors, from the command center's own sensing stage and
from several other command levels. The process is shown in Figure 5.
3. The C3 Functional Areas and Connectivities
Several functional areas enter into the C3 architecture. These are:
[Ref. 3: p. 11]
• The Command area.
• The Information Management area.
• The Sensor Management area.
• The Engagement Management area.
• The Communications Management area.
• The System Management area.
The Command functional area includes planning, directing and as-
sessing operations to achieve the assigned mission objectives.
The Information Management functional area includes acquiring, proc-
essing, and distributing data to ensure timely, accurate, and complete infor-
mation, required by all users. It provides information collection, processing,
evaluation and distribution services at each command level, resulting in an
up-to-date tactical surveillance picture for the area of interest.
The Sensor Management functional area includes allocating, coordi-
nating, and monitoring sensor assets to support decision making and weapons
use. This requires that rules of engagement, emission control, and mutual in-
terference with other sensors or communication assets are taken into consid-
eration, before the surveillance data is fed into the Information Management
area.
The Engagement Management functional area includes allocating,
controlling, coordinating, and monitoring force assets to support execution of
combat operations.
The Communications Management functional area includes allocating,
controlling, coordinating, and monitoring the force assets such as decision
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Figure 5. The Command and Control process: A functional Model [Ref. 3:
p.11].
Finally, the System Management functional area allows a commander
to assess the status of the C3 system state and reconfigure it in case of dis-
ruption.
The connectivities among the functional areas are shown in Figure 6.
These are: [Ref 3: p. 13]
• The connectivity among the Command functional areas.
• The connectivity among the Information Management functional areas.
• The connectivities among the Engagement, Sensor, Communications, and
System Management functional areas at different command levels.
• The interfaces between command and the unified commands.
• The interfaces among Information sources and Information Management
functional areas at various command levels.
• The interface between weapon systems and the Information and Engage-
ment Management functional areas.
There are three types of connectivities:
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Figure 6. Functional Connectivities: Basic C3 structure [Ref. 3: p. 12].
• Coordination type - between functional areas to ensure that assets are
employed in accordance with command guidance.
• Information Exchange type - allowing for the transfer of data among the
various areas to support the needs of the functional areas mentioned be-
fore.
4. The C3 Structure
Functional areas and connectivities can be expanded to all command
levels forming the C3 structure. Generally speaking, the operational
commanders directly involved in the joint naval tactical C3 in closed sea areas
are:
• The Fleet Commander-in-Chief.
• The Battle Force/Battle Group (BF/BG) Commander.
• The Unit Commander.
• The Platform Commander.
According to Halushynsky and Beam, four options for connectitivies
apply to the naval C3 architecture of the future. [Ref. 3: p. 14]
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• Parallel connectivity between the Information Management areas at all
command levels.
• Parallel downward dissemination for the interface between the informa-
tion sources and the Information Management areas managed from their
own levels.
• Hierarchical connectivity betweeen adjacent asset management areas.
• Interface between weapon systems and the Information Management area
at the platform level and between weapon systems and the Engagement
Management areas at the battle force, battle group, and unit levels.
The information doesn't necessarily flow to all lower command levels.
It is the responsibility of the appropriate commander to designate addressees
and security levels. Furthermore, information must be geographically tailored
to the capabilities of the recipient command level. Connectivity to commands
below the BF/BG level from higher level sensors is maintained only when the
surveillance units are tasked for the direct support of a particular unit or plat-
form command.
The parallel connectivity of the Information Management areas at all
command levels allows for timely information exchange. The connectivity of
weapon systems to Information Management areas is limited to the level of the
platform carrying the system. When the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)
directly controls certain weapon systems, especially those whose capability
extends beyond the horizon or those which are dedicated to the defense of the
BG, then a direct interface is maintained between the applicable weapon sys-
tems and the BF/BG command level or the unit level via the Engagement
Management functional area.
5. The C3 Naval Architecture
The conceptual C3 naval architecture is depicted by mapping the actual
naval operational commands and the various surveillance sources on the ar-
chitecture previously analyzed. Part of this architecture is shown in Figure 7,
covering from the Fleet Commander-in-Chief level down to the platform level,
including both ground and afloat nodes.
Information, sensor and weapons management are essentially the main
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Figure 7. Conceptual C3 Naval Architecture: Structural depiction [Ref 3: p. 15J.
14
Halushynsky and Beam claim that the major characteristics of the In-
formation Management function are the existence of the information base at
each command, the processing at each level both ashore and afloat and the
evaluation of tactical intelligence. The information is usually acquired in a
data format for ADP because of volume and time constraints. Its processing
has to do with the location determination of all platforms of interest and their
subsequent classification.
Surveillance assets at each command level serve as information
sources for air, surface, and subsurface contacts. The data is sent to the In-
formation Management areas at own level and below. This goes down to the
BG level for its area of interest on an equal basis and to the unit and platform
levels whenever tasked. On the other hand, the exchange of processed infor-
mation (the tactical picture) can take place both upward or downward, tailored
to the interests and responsibilities of the intended recipient. This parallel
connectivity between the Information Management areas allows the Fleet
Commander-in-Chief to acquire the necessary data directly from any platform
under his control. This connectivity ensures timely and accurate information
which is essential in light of the highly sophisticated future threat.
Weapons systems can be controlled by the Engagement functional
areas of the own level command or by the BG or unit command in case of a
coordinated defense or attack. Targeting information is supplied from the In-
formation Management areas of the respective command levels or by plat-
form's own sensors. Finally unit commanders can control platforms
appropriate to their assigned responsibilities. For example, the AAWC (Anti-
air Warfare Coordinator) is responsible for the defense of the battle group
against air attack. He can assign fighter interceptors from the BG assets as
well as SAMs (Surface- to-Air Missiles) on various platforms to specific targets.
The fire control requirements including midcourse guidance are the responsi-
bility of each combat asset. Figure 8 summarizes these concepts covering part
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1. The requirements statement.
So far, a typical C3 naval architecture has been conceptually devel-
oped. Throughout this analysis the communications dimension appears to play
a dominant and critical role. This role is even more profound given the com-
plexity and the inherent limitations confronting a Naval Commander in a ge-
ographically restricted tactical area. He needs connectivity both with the
environment and with his forces. He essentially needs an integrated tactical
communication system to accomplish this task. This particular system must
meet certain operational requirements. A thorough description of the features






• High Capacity and CNI functions.
• High Responsiveness.
• Connectivity.
• Ease of Installation and Operation.
• Extended Life Cycle and Affordability.
2. The requirements description.
The size, weight and power considerations of the system's terminals
dictate the autonomy of the platform carrying them. These must suit the plat-
form's space availability, without restricting its flexibility. Candidate platforms
such as ships, fighter and reconaissance/surveillance aircraft and command
centers afloat have varying degrees of autonomy requirements. Furthermore
direct data distribution from remote sensors to remote platforms enhances the
degree of the system's autonomy since no central information collection would
be necessary. Loss of a control center must not impair the system. Individual
platforms of the system must be able to communicate as long as other termi-
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nals exist. Complete availability and functionality is required to cope with
current and future requirements. Overall the system must be flexible enough
to adapt readily and quickly to any technological, organizational and threat
changes.
Non-nodal connectivity is required to provide absolute system
survivability. The wide platform dispersion and the information distribution in-
dependently of any network configuration will enhance the assets' survival.
Continuously shrinking reaction times, especially in closed sea areas of oper-
ations where strike ranges are relatively short, have made the requirement for
a survivable system essential. EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) hardening is con-
sidered necessary for sealing the system's terminals. ARMs (Anti-radiation
missiles), active enemy jamming and deception of system's transmissions can
reduce the effectiveness of the system if this doesn't include advanced ECCM
(Electronic Counter-Counter Measures) features for high resistance to jam-
ming. Such enhancements are possible today with the use of state-of-the-art
technology. Spread spectrum modulation and adaptive antenna nulling tech-
niques form the basis for a solution which will guarantee transmission security
(TRANSEC) even if the desired signal-to-jamming ratios are not favorable. In
general, the system must be survivable enough to continually perform essen-
tial Command and Control functions irrespective of potential attacks.
Message security (COMSEC), is required through built-in encryption
modules to provide low probability of exploitation (LPE). Low probability of
intercept (LPI) must be also provided to counter enemy efforts for signal anal-
ysis through passive ESM (Electronic Support Measures) techniques. The
system must be secure enough to allow naval functions to be undertaken
without fear of compromise.
Enhanced reliability with minimal MBTF (Mean-Time-Between-Failures)
should also be provided by the system. Extensive testing during procurement
and built-in testing capability are needed for this purpose. Equipment com-
monality and a modular approach are needed for an easy-to-maintain solution.
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Absolute availability is required for maintaining connectivity. Sufficient
Mean-time-to-Repair (MTTR) is a must. The employment of such a system
must provide terminals which will be technologically compatible with the ex-
isting equipment used to serve parts of the purpose for which this system is
proposed. These are UHF/AM radios and hardware used for other tactical
links. Interoperability among terminal platforms and among services is a must
for providing maximum flexibility in future upgrades and ease of transition
from the previous level of technology to the currently proposed one. Ulti-
mately the goal here is to allow the naval forces and the naval commanders
to interface actively with the forces and the commanders of other services.
Since capacity is driven by the number of nets handled by the system,
it must be high enough to cope with the ever increasing needs for higher
info-rates. An expanded wideband service can meet the communication re-
quirements' growth and the accelerating number of links needed. This can be
coupled with Multiple Access techniques offered by current technology, since
the UHF band, a primary candidate for system's operation, is already con-
gested. An integrative form of Communication, Navigation and Identification
(CNI) capability must be addressed as well. Digital data link and precise navi-
gation and identification functions must be incorporated into the system. The
traditional TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) and IFF (Identification of Friendly
and Foe) functions should be performed by this system and in such a way that
mutual interference and position ambiguity will be resolved.
Real-time information transfer is needed for operationally useful sol-
utions. The system must be highly responsive to cope with this need.
Subscribers' connectivity should not be limited. No major space
changes must be required for the installation of the system's terminals and
no extensive training must be necessary for the use of the system. Having
described the system's features, the next step is the initiation of the engineer-
ing effort which will essentially turn these features into hardware itself.
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II. THE THEORY OF ANTI-JAM (AJ) SYSTEMS
The survivability of a modern integrated tactical communication system in
an intense EW environment depends heavily upon its degree of protection
against enemy intentional jamming, its level of signal undetectability and
message coding efficiency. A current AJ system should possess such capabil-
ities to meet these requirements in the most efficient way. The first two re-
quirements can be currently provided by the employment of spread spectrum
modulation techniques in the design of such a system. These techniques which
are essentially 'internal' means of signal protection will be analyzed in detail
in the following sections. Several existing 'external' techniques for signal pro-
tection, such as adaptive antenna steering, make use of the current technology
by operating on the directivity parameter, in order to provide external signal
protection. Although this further enhances the AJ capability of a communi-
cations system, it is not always desirable , as it happens here, with this pro-
posed AJ system. Because this is essentially a broadcasting system,
omnidirectional coverage is desired. Therefore, directional transmission is not
considered. Thus, a brief discussion of adaptive null forming is included at the
end of this chapter. The last requirement of message protection is normally
met today by the employment of 'state-of- the-art' ciphering schemes, such as
Reed-Solomon and Viterbi coding and decoding. Code theory is beyond the
scope of this study and therefore it will not be analyzed here.
A. SPREAD SPECTRUM MODULATION TECHNIQUES
The means available to protect the transmitted signal are essentially radi-
ated power, bandwidth and redundancy in the message. The most significant
parameter in the protection of the message is the processing gain ratio, be-
tween the transmitted band and the signal band. Given a transmitter and a
jammer, the loci of the points giving the same signal to noise ratio are circles
whose radii depend upon the processing gain. This means that low interfer-
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ence of the signal against jamming effects can be achieved by acting upon the
signal processing gain.
From the operational point of view it means that the effects of the jammer
are reduced or that the enemy is forced to radiate considerable power over a
wide-band when the signal is radiated on a narrow band with 'frequency hop-
ping' or continually when the signal is radiated pseudo-randomly in time.
Spread spectrum modulation is a method of increasing the bandwidth of a
radio frequency (RF) carrier beyond the bandwidth usually required for it to
be transmitted, and thus increasing the processing gain. The basic concept is
simple. The actual information signal is introduced into the previously men-
tioned RF carrier, after being modulated in a digital form. If the intelligence is
analogue as voice is. it is converted to digital form by 'vocoding'. This modu-
lated signal is then mixed with the spreading pseudo-random code signal to
create a wideband pseudo-noise signal for transmission. This final signal has
a low power density and cannot be easily distinguished from random thermal
noise.
This particular spreading of a modulated RF-carrier over the largest fre-
quency range, possesses a number of considerable advantages: [Ref. 4:
p.7-8].
• Selective addressing capability.
• Code division multiplexing for multiple access.
• Low density power spectra for signal hiding.
• Message screening from eavesdroppers.
• High resolution ranging.
• Interference rejection.
• Secrecy of communications.
The art of expanding the bandwidth of a signal, transmitting the expanded
signal, and recovering the desired signal by despreading the received spread
spectrum into the original information bandwidth is a process attempting to
deliver error-free information in a noisy signal environment. The techniques
utilized for this are the following:
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• Direct modulation with pseudo-random sequence (PN).
• Frequency hopping (FH).
• Time hopping (TH).
• A combination of the previous three techniques (hybrid).
• Chirp modulation.
Figure 9 on page 23 shows a pictorial representation of the spread spec-
trum techniques in the time/frequency domain.
1. General Concept
The concept of the spread spectrum theory is expressed by C.E.
Shannon in the form of channel capacity [Ref. 4: p.5-6]. The idea of increasing
the security of a radio link using an artificially increased bandwidth is a direct
result of his examinations regarding the behavior and the capacity of a tele-
communication channel interference conditions.
C = Wx log 2 (1 +S/N)
Where,
C: Capacity in bits per second
W: Bandwidth in hertz
N: Noise power
S: Signal power
The above formula after mathematical simplifications can be rewritten
in the form:
W = NxC
The first formula shows the relationship between the ability of a chan-





















Figure 9. Spread Spectrum Techniques: Time/Frequency domain represen-
tation.
existing in the channel, and the bandwidth used to transmit the information.
The second formula shows that for any given noise-to-signal ratio we can have
a low information error rate by increasing the bandwidth used to transfer the
information. The methods with which the information itself may be embedded
on the spread spectrum signal will be examined later. Supposing that Trans-
mitter Power is (S), Jammer Power is (J), Channel Bandwidth is (W) and In-
formation bit-rate is (R).
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which describes that it is inversely proportional to the bit error rate. Rear-
ranging the equation, it yields a new quotient J/S, as the ratio of interference






and it is the ratio by which a certain bit error-rate will be maintained.
With conventional systems, the bandwidth W of the transmission chan-
nel is equal to the bit-rate (SSB) or a multiple of this (AMDSB) so that the ratio
(W/R) is constant. In these cases, the jamming margin is determined by the
signal to noise ratio rather than (W/R). With the spread spectrum techniques
the ratio W/R is not constant. The bandwidth W can be artificially expanded
with respect to the minimum bandwidth determined by the bit-rate R of the in-
formation. It is easily assumed that the jamming margin will increase linearly
with the ratio W/R with a constant bit error-rate. The processing gain Gp can




Gp (cfS) = 10 xlog(-^-)
The jamming margin of a complete telecommunication system can be
calculated by taking into consideration the system losses Vsys , and the signal-
to-interference ratio Vd at the demodulator. In this case the jamming margin is:
"5" = Gp - Vd ~ Vsys
A typical processing gain curve is shown in Figure 10. The increase of the
jamming margin is possible, as the jamming threshold is dependent on the
spreading code. For instance, the spreading of a narrow-band signal from 5
KHz to 50 MHz, increases the jamming threshold, to 36 dB, when the required
S/N at the demodulator is + 1 dB and Vsys = +3 dB. That means that the in-
terference signal must be 36 dB stronger (approximately 4000 times) than the
required signal, at the receiver input, before the demodulation of the required
signal is affected. Thus, a satisfactory value for the processing gain is deter-
mined by high spreading code rates [Ref. 4: p. 10].
a. The Direct Sequence Method
Direct sequence modulation is the modulation of a carrier by a
digital code sequence whose frequency is much higher than the information
signal bandwidth. This code sequence is a fast pseudo-noise (pseudo-random)
one, which has a very wide spectrum with characteristics similar to the noise.
Thus, the already modulated and amplified RF carrier is increased in band-
width by using BPSK modulation with a certain, suitably binary code sequence
of pseudo-noise type (PN). It can be achieved by using a balanced modulator
for the PSK, such as a four-diode mixer. This mixer is a 0/180 phase shifter.





Figure 10. Typical Processing Gain Curve: jamming threshold [Ref. 4: p. 12].
shown in Figure 11. The BPSK balanced modulator is analyzed in [Ref. 4:
p. 109-125]. The actual information can be embedded either on the RF carrier
(e.g. FM modulated RF carrier), or on the PN code sequence by modulo 2 ad-
dition. See Figure 12.
The PN sequence used for spreading the signal has a frequency
spectrum whose envelope has the function [sinw/w] 2 . The zero positions cor-
respond to multiples of the clock frequency. The spectrum of the phase shift
carrier also is of the same shape [sinw/w] 2
,
which is located symmetrically
around the original carrier frequency. Since its higher power density is con-
centrated into the main lobe, it is sufficient, in order to process this signal, to
accept, as the minimum required bandwidth, the frequency-band between the
first two null-to-null points around the center frequency. This bandwidth is de-
termined by the code-rate and it is identical with twice the clock frequency of













Figure 11. Direct Sequence (DS) Modulator: frequency spectrum represen-
tation [Ref. 4: p. 17].
The main characteristics of this particular power density spectrum
have been studied and verified in the laboratory. These are listed below [Ref.
5: p.6].





• The spacing of the spectral lines is determined by the code rate and the
code length (maximal) [Ref. 4: p.28].
Spacing: [ 2 n -1
• A suppressed carrier signal, produced by employing biphase-balanced
modulation, is difficult to detect because it is well below the noise level
produced by the code modulation.
• More power is available for sending useful information because the
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Figure 12. Direct Sequence (DS) Tx/Rx: time domain representation [Ref. 4:
p.18].
• The signal has a constant envelope level so that transmitted power effi-
ciency is maximized for the badwidth used.
• The power of the main lobe is determined by the code rate, and it contains
almost 90% of the total signal power. High side lobe power density is not
useful (see Figure 13).
Power density: 1
2xfi,
• In any case the direct sequence system has a main lobe bandwidth that
is the function of the waveshape and the code-rate used (see Figure 13).
The power spectrum of a purely random binary code sequence with a bit
duration To is derived in [Ref. 6: app. E].
Generally, with sufficiently large spread bandwidths and suitable
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Figure 13. Direct Sequence (DS) Spread Spectrum: power distribution [Ref.
4: p. 23].
original carrier will be distributed virtually constantly over a wide frequency
range, and the power density (W/Hz) will have a very low value. When re-
ceived on a narrow band receiver (not synchronized and authorized), this
signal will be heard as noise only, which will hardly change when turning over
a wider frequency range, and which can be so weak that it disappears into the
interference and noise level [Ref. 5: p. 7]. Such transmissions are very secure
and difficult to discover, and they will hardly ever cause interference to other
telecommunication links using the same frequency range, due to their low
spectral power density. The prerequisite is, of course, a sufficiently high car-
rier suppression of the mixer, and good linearity of the amplifier so that the
carrier is not regenerated due to intermodulation.
The military application of this method is obviously based on these
unique properties. Furthermore, by exchanging bandwidth for signal-to-noise
ratio according to Shannon's information theory, the required communication
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capacity can still be achieved with a consequent saving in power [Ref. 6: p.76],
(keeping S/N low-increasing W/R). At the receiver, the signal is correlated with
an exact replica of the PN code sequence used at the transmitter. The phase
reversals of the original PN code are thus removed in this de-spreading proc-
ess, while the phase reversals due to the binary information alone are then
extracted by a PRK demodulator (see Figure 14). From above, it is apparent
that very many characteristics of the transmitted spread signal must be al-
ready known at the receive end (authorized receiver):
• The code sequence used for spreading.
• The exact clock frequency of the spreading code.
• The exact starting time of the code (phase position) (synchronization).
• The exact carrier frequency (carrier and clock frequency can be derived
from a standard synthesizer at both ends).
The correlator mentioned above is again a biphase balanced
modulator which serves as first mixer by using an already spread RF-carrier
that has been shifted to the value of the IF.
The encoding signal for the data information is usually a maximal
length pseudo-random code sequence derived from an n-stage shift register
using feedback. The length of the codeword is 2" — 1 bits after which it repeats
itself. The shift register is clocked typically by a frequency source at a high
bit-rate (e.g.: 1Mbit/s). The output of the shift register is then combined with
the data steam using modulo 2-addition by means of logic gates (see Figure
12). In practice, there are a number of such code "patterns" which may be
generated for multichannel operation and the most suitable codes are those
which yield the minimum amount of cross-talk due to cross-correlation at the
receiver.
(1) Processing Gain of DS. The processing gain of a direct se-
quence system is a function of the RF bandwidth of the transmitted signal










The assumption is that the RF bandwidth is the same as that
of the main lobe which is twice the bandwidth of the spreading code clock rate.
Given that normally only 90 percent of the total power is contained in the main
lobe, for a system having a 10 Mcps (Mega chips per second) code rate and






It is assumed that the processing gain is only limited by current technical ca-
pabilities. Available integrated circuits allow limited code generation at rates
up to 200 or even 300 Mcps. As the code rate increase, operating errors have
more impact on the overall performance. Also at higher rates it is not desira-
ble to have too much gain. The practical upper limit tends to be between
50-100 Mcps.
On the other hand, there is a lower limit to the data rate, due
to propagation instability and phase noise at the local oscillator. A typical limit
of 10 bps is used. Now, considering the two marginal limits we can see that for
practical systems the processing gain Gp is limited to about: [Ref. 4: p.26].
GpdB = 10 xlog[.9 x^-] = 69c/B
(2) Applications of DS. In conclusion, the main application of
the spread-spectrum direct sequence method is in the field of satellite com-
munications. As satellite transmission power is very costly to provide, it must
be used effectively. It is also used in hybrid techniques in combination with
'Time Hopping' or 'Frequency Hopping'. Despite some of their vulnerabilities,
direct sequence systems are extensively used because of their simplicity and
low cost, in providing high Gp.
b. The Frequency Hopping (FH) Method
The second method of spreading the frequency bandwidth of a
transmitted signal is to allow the carrier frequency to jump from one frequency
to another by selecting one of a large number of available channels. This se-
quential selection of the frequencies is made according to a PN-code se-
quence, and will therefore appear to be random in a non-authorized receiver
(See Figures 15, 16).
The authorized receiver controls its local oscillator with the same
PN-code sequence and will therefore follow the frequency hopping pattern of
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Figure 15. Frequency Hopping (FH) System: time domain representation [Ref.
4: p. 30].
method can be easily regarded as the present state-of-the-art, and it is feasible
since fast frequency synthesizers and the required programmable dividers,
PLL-circuits, and VCOs are available. The theoretical processing gain that this
method gives is :
BWR r
R info
Where N is the number of the available channels.
For example, for N = 1000 channels among which a hopper jumps
back and forth, the processing gain will be : 10 x log 10 3 = 30dB [Ref. 4: p. 31].
The PN code sequence which determines the sequential "hops" within the
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Channel used at time T
Alternate channels
Figure 16. Frequency Hopping (FH) System: frequency spectrum represen-
tation [Ref. 4: p. 31].
range available, is created as in the case of DS method, by using the digital
data stream.
Frequency hopping is an ECCM technique originally conceived as
a method of combatting the effects of communications jammers. It also pro-
vides LPI against enemy ESM activities such as direction finding and position
location. The main task of this method is to evade the jammer- not resist it. To
achieve this, it is essential that the hopping pattern be unpredictable to the
hostile forces. This is met by using the PN code. The performance of frequency
hopping against various types of jammers will be discussed in the following
sections.
(1) Frequency Hopping Rate Determination. The type of infor-
mation being sent and its rate, the amount of redundancy used, if any, and the
distance to the nearest potential interferer, are the main factors that determine
the minimum frequency switching rate in a frequency hopping system [Ref 4:
p.34].
As previously mentioned, a large number of channels, usable
on demand, gives a high Gp for the particular frequency hopper. This can be
seen easily in the following description, and digital modulation is again to be
assumed for simplicity.
One channel is to be interfered with during these consider-
ations, where the interference power should be greater than that of the re-
quired power. In a conventional narrowband system, the error rate in this
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channel would then be 1 or 100%. In the case of a FH-system, the error rate
amounts to the following, if one data bit is transmitted per frequency jump:
No of interfered channels/No of available channels = JIN
A narrow-band interfering station with J = 1 would result in an
error rate of p = 1 x 10 3 in the case of a 1000-channel FH system with N = 1000.
This is already a good value for voice communication; however, it is not suffi-
cient for data transmission. For this reason, one has started to use more than
one frequency jump per data bit (e.g. 3 per data bit), and to make a majority
decision at the receive and (e.g. 2 from 3). Then the possibility of errors can
be considerably reduced. If "c" represents the number of channels per bit, "r"
the required number of interfered channels in order to interfere with one bit,
and "p" the possibility of error for a normal FH system, the new possibility of








In the previous example with J = 1, N = 1000. p = 1x 10 3 . the
probability of error can be reduced to the following with c= 3 channels per









x (3 + p) = 3 x 10
-6
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The error rate versus the number of channels jammed (J/N)
for various chip decision criteria in multichip transmission is shown in Figure
17 [Ref. 4: p.35].
The general characteristics of the frequency hopping method are then the fol-
lowing:
• The frequency hopping rate is a function of the information rate.
• The information error rate cannot be reduced below J/N unless some form
of redundant transmission is used.
• The number of frequency channels required is determined by the desired
interference rejection capability (jamming margin) and chip error toler-
ance.
• The correlated (dehopped) signal seen in a non-coherent frequency hop-
ping receiver follows the shape of the function below:
/ sin x x2
^ x '
• It has a main lobe bandwidth equal to twice the chip rate.
• Chip rate is bounded on the low side by multipath and repeater interfer-
ence considerations.
The best rule for variable geometry situations is to hop as fast
as possible. This will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Again the synchronization between transmitter and receiver, will enable the
receiver to follow the PN-sequence and hopping pattern in accordance with the
transmitter, and as such is essential.
c. The Time Hopping Method
This method, used to counter impulsive jamming, is normally used
in combination with other techniques as it is less efficient in terms of exploita-
tion and deception. It consists of varying, in accordance with a PN code se-
quence, the time of signal transmission. It also widens the spectrum of a
transmit signal and when it is used together with DS or FH systems can offer
a considerable improvement to their characteristics. It is mainly a kind of
pulse modulation: that is the code sequence is used to key the transmitter on
and off. These on and off times are pseudo-random, like the code, with an av-
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Figure 17. Frequency Hopping (FH) System: error rate versus fraction of
channels jammed (J/N) [Ref. 4: p. 37].
erage transmit duty cycle of about 50%. It is used for reducing interference
between systems in TDM. Stringent timing requirements must be placed on
the overall system to ensure minimum overlap between transmitters. Also as
in any other coded communications system, the codes must be considered
carefully from the standpoint of their cross-correlation properties.
This type of modulation offers very little in the way of interference
rejection, as a continuous carrier at the signal center frequency can block
communications effectively. The main advantage offered, is in the reduced
duty cycle; that is, an interfering transmitter, to be really effective, it would be
forced to transmit continuously (assuming the PN coding used is unknown to
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the interferer). The power required of the reduced duty-cycle time hopper
would be less than of the interfering transmitter, by a factor equal to the signal
duty cycle. As was previously mentioned, when used in a hybrid form with FH
it offers improved AJ performance against single frequency interferers. It is
also useful for multiple access and other special uses, mainly because of its
simplicity in generating the transmitted signal [Ref. 4: p.44]. A block diagram
of TH Tx/Rx is shown in Figure 18.
d. Hybrid Forms
The combination of FH, TH and PN modulation result in some hy-
brid techniques, which are best used to ensure the required degree of pro-
tection against jamming and interception. They allow the adaption of the
system characteristics to the requirements of the operational scenario, with
simpler means. Furthermore, other signal processing techniques, such as for-
ward error correcting codes, contribute to the protection of the message.
A hybrid DS/FH-system, employs the direct sequence and the fre-
quency hopping method simultaneously. The total processing gain is equal to








This combination is very important, when a certain processing gain
cannot be obtained using a single method on its own, or only with difficulty.
If, for example, a gain of 47 dB is required at a data rate R =
10Kbps for interference suppression, it will be necessary to spread the signal
over a badwidth of W = 500 MHz in the case of a DS-system, which will re-
quire a PN-clock rate of 250 MBit/s. In the case of a FH-system, it will be nec-
essary to hop between 50.000 channels. Both possibilities are at the limits of
what is technically possible. If, now, we take a combination of these two























Figure 18. Time Hopping (TH) Tx/Rx: block diagram [Ref. 4: p. 43].
FH-system to obtain the previous processing gain of 47 dB, with normal means
[Ref. 4: p.5].
Typically, in spread spectrum communication systems with multiple
access, the DS or FH-method is often used together with the time hopping (TH)
method. In this case, the individual stations transmit only at several time in-
tervals, determined by a common PN code. This allows us to achieve the con-
dition that only one station is transmitting at any particular time. Even though
spread spectrum signals can be operated quite well in the same frequency
band, it is possible for local transmitters and receivers to be affected by un-
wanted desensitization. The block diagrams of several hybrid forms are shown
in Figures 19, 20 [Ref. 4: p.47-54]. Some of their main characteristics are given
in the next sections.
(1) FH/DS Modulation
• Hybrid FH/DS transmissions are straightforward super-impositions of di-
rect sequence modulation on a frequency hopping carrier (see Figure 19).
• The same code sequence generator can supply code-data both to the fre-
quency synthesizer to program its hopping pattern and to the balanced
modulator (see Figure 19).






































Figure 19. Frequency Hopping Direct Sequence (FH/DS) Tx-Rx: block diagram
[Ref. 4: p. 49-50].
• The jamming margin can be significantly less than the simple FH or DS
system. Further explanation will follow.
• The composite processing gain is higher than that of the individual meth-
ods.
• This method extends spectrum spreading capability.
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Figure 20. Time Hopping (TH/DS) Tx-Rx: block diagram [Ref. 4: p. 54].
(2) THIFH Modulation
• Hybrid TH/FH employs transmission and reception on several frequen-
cies, at different times.
• Provides random access and discrete address.
• Improves anti-jamming capacity of spread spectrum systems.
• Reduces the 'near-far' effect.
(3) TH/DS Modulation
• Hybrid TH/DS employs time-hopped DS transmission in a pseudo-random
manner (see Figure 20).
• Time hopping 'on-off decisions can be easily derived from the same code
sequence generator, deriving the spectrum spreading code.
• This pseudo-random time division permits more channel users, improves
operation over simple code division multiplex and allows more accesses.
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Re: code clock rate
n: shift register length
r: register stages not sensed
(See Figure 20). [Ref. 4: p.54].
B. MULTIPLE ACCESS
A busy tactical communication link usually requires relays that are capable
of conveying heavy traffic originating at many ground stations to a large num-
ber of receiving destinations. These requirements led to the development of
multiple access techniques. The main methods of multiple-access are: (see
Figure 21)
• Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA).
• Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA).
• Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) or Spread Spectrum Multiple Ac-
cess (SSMA).
The first two forms are exact analogies of the multiplexing schemes used
in analogue and digital multichannel terrestrial systems. CDMA has found only
restricted use in military systems.
Having achieved access to the relay with one of these techniques, then the
second basic characteristic is the type of modulation used in the specific ac-
cessing channel. After this, a way of handling heavy traffic within the channel
must be defined. The traditional method is the multiplexing of signals, which
is a process in which a number of different messages are combined to be
transmitted over a common communication channel. Figures 22, 23 show the


















Figure 21. Multiple Access: Division of time-frequency space.
a. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)
In FDMA the earth stations are assigned frequency bands for the
transmission of their signals. The assigned bands are separated by guard
bands to reduce interference. The relay power is divided among the carriers
that are accessing it all the time. The most common types of FDMA schemes


















Figure 22. Multiple Access: categorization of several techniques.
technique was introduced in the analogue modulation and the second in the
digital modulation. As the name implies, each carrier is utilized for a single
analogue or digital channel, in terms of accessing the relay. In terms of mod-
ulating the assigned carrier within the channel, FM and QPSK are used re-
spectively. For the multiplexing of several messages in each particular
channel, FDM is also used. In FDM, the available spectrum of the channel is
divided so that the signal at the transmitter is allocated to a different part of
the spectrum, and the demultiplexing at the receiver is achieved by frequency
selective filters. The disadvantages of this method, such as cross-modulation









Figure 23. Multiple Access: signal flow.
b. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
In TDMA, the earth stations are assigned time slots which are sep-
arated by guard time periods for the transmission of their signals. During its
assigned time slot the earth station (transmitter) has the entire transponder
(relay) bandwidth and power available. This type of access is a time gating
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function which correctly locates each transmission burst relative to the rest of
the network.
It is now clear that the signals pass through the relay with no
interaction. An access channel in TDMA designates a particular sequence of
time slots. These time slots occur periodically at a definite repetition fre-
quency, known as the 'frame repetition rate' of the system. All other channels
in this arrangement would have the same frame rate but different times of oc-
currence, and possibly slot durations.
It is also essential for this system to use a signal as a time refer-
ence or relay clock, for maintaining synchronization. So the signals can be
kept separated in time and in a specified sequence by maintaining specified
time intervals relative to the relay clock. This can be done to within 0.1 /isecs.
The procedure of time is illustrated in Figure 24. Briefly, each station that
wishes to transmit a signal to another station, makes use of the timing marks
that are transmitted by the relay, at intervals of T seconds. Then to set its local
clock, a station transmits a series of pulses at intervals nominally T seconds,
in length. It then compares their repetition rate, when they are received after
retransmission, it then adjusts its local clock PRF to the PRF of the received
signal, such that the difference is eliminated.
The repeater badwidth must be large enough to keep the signal in
one time slot from affecting signals in other time slots. The user ctations can
transmit message information in any manner they desire, provided that the
message waveforms are suitable for passing through the repeater and do not
overlap their assigned time slots.
In determining the time frame length, it is assumed that there are
two modes of operation. The first mode allocates each station one time slot per
frame. For real time voice transmission, the frame rate could be equal to the
convenient sampling rate (8 kHz), is T=125 ms. The second mode is a store-
and forward operation in which many message samples are stored and trans-
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Figure 24. TDMA: data transmission.
(1) TDMA frame and Burst format. The typical TDMA and burst
format is shown in Figure 25. For simplicity a four-access network is shown,
but up to about 60 could be accommodated in an actual system. Typically 5 to
15 access per frame are expected in operating networks. A typical burst is
expanded in the lower portion of the same figure. The guard time is usually
100 to 200 msecs, providing an assurance against successive burst overlap-
ping. The burst lengths also are normally variable, since variable gross traffic
loads are transmitted by each station. Reconfiguring of the traffic load is easily
accomplished by reallocating the burst lengths assigned to each station, by
some means of digital control. Then a carrier-recovery/ bit-timing-recovery
(CR/BTR) sequence follows. This is used by the PSK demodulator in each re-
ceiver to recover local carrier or digital clock for coherent demodulation. For
example, the CR/BTR sequence is typically 60 bits in a 60 Mbs system.
After CR/BTR, a unique word (UW) of about 20 bits is trans-
mitted, which is used, at the receiver, to establish an accurate time reference
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Figure 25. TDMA: frame and burst format.
ternatively, a station identification code (SIC) of about 6 bits can follow the
(UW) to provide identification function.
The probability of missing or falsely detecting the UW is of
primary importance in practical TDMA systems, for obvious reasons. Gener-
ally a probability of miss or false UW detection of (1x10 8) or better is required
at the threshold bit-error-rate (i.e. 1x10 4 ).
The total preamble will usually be 100 to 200 bits per burst
frame. Typical frame lengths from 125 msecs to 2 msecs are practical for high
capacity TDMA. Usually the resulting percentage of overhead to total bits per
48
frame is 5% and the data transmission efficiency is 95%. The total time allo-
cated to guard time is only 0.3% of the total frame time.
(2) Transmission efficiency - Channel capacity of TDMA
systems. The frame length, preamble length, and number of accesses or
bursts per frame determine the transmission efficiency of a TDMA system.The
frame length is directly proportional to the efficiency.
Formulating the above, we can get the digitized voice en-
coded channel capacity as:
C-ixp-Jf]
Where:
R: relay transmission link bit rate
V: bit-rate for one voice channel
P: number of bits in the preamble
N: number of bursts in frame
T: the frame period
Thus, TDMA can theoretically provide the highest channel
capacity because, in theory, the only inefficiency arises from the guard times
between adjacent slots. However, TDMA requires that analogue signals be
digitized and this necessitates analogue-to-digital conversion.
c. Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
In CDMA, the transmissions of each earth station are spread over
the time-frequency plane by a coded transformation. In this scheme, every
accessing station uses the entire repeater badwidth, to transmit digital data
which is impressed on the RF carrier by code modulation. A long code se-
quence, typically a 2" P-N one, is transmitted for each digital data 1, and either
no code or separate P-N code is transmitted for each data 0. The sequence
length and data rate are chosen so that the RF signal spectrum fills the
repeater. At the receiving end station a correlating code recognizer is re-
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quired. This usually consists of P-N sequence generator and a recognition gate
followed by an integrator. When the correct code is received, and the local
generator is in phase, a stream of ones will flow from the recognition gate, and
reception of a predetermined number of ones is taken as indication of a
code-bit (Figure 26). Again the synchronization problem is of vital importance.
The receiving station has to synchronize its code generators with the incoming
code. The advantages of the method are similar to the ones mentioned for the
spread spectrum techniques.
To date, spead spectrum multiple access (SSMA) has been used
only in military SATCOM systems, with narrow-band transponders (2-5 MHz).
It is very suitable in this application, where mixed size and capacity stations
wish to operate in a net. The overall system efficiency is not high, but jamming
of the satellite is much more difficult than with FDMA or TDMA systems.
The multiple access capability of SSMA can be understood more
easily by consideration of the spectrum of a long P-N sequence. There will be
single spectral lines at the frame repetition rate, and the clock rate, and mul-
tiples and products of the two. Not all lines will be present for a given se-
quence, and different P-N sequences with the same clock rate will have
different spectral line structures. (The use of an MSRG with 4 feedback taps
for the P-N sequence generation has been tested and the results are shown in
[Ref. 5: p. 18]. The codes can thus be added to produce a combined spectrum
which can subsequently be separated into the original two spectra by a pair
of matched filters. The code-recognizers can be thought of as matched filters
which respond only to their present spectral line pattern; because of the com-
plex nature of the spectrum, the response time of the filter must be long, as it
must respond to spectral lines down to the reciprocal of the frame rate.
SSMA coding is very similar to pulse compression techniques
used in radar systems. It produces a single, short pulse from the target echo
for a long transmitted code sequence. In a typical case the signal might be a
64 bit digital stream. (8 bit PCM with 8 kHz sampling rate) which triggers a 2 n
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Figure 26. Spread Spectrum Multiple Access (SSMA): PN sequence scheme.
used (2 G ), although this would not imparl a great deal of security to the system.
To obtain security a very long sequence is needed and lower data bit rates
must be used. Companding and non-linear sampling in the PCM generator can
also reduce the data BER considerably.
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III. SPREAD SPECTRUM SYSTEMS IN A JAMMING ENVIRONMENT
A. THE THREAT
A military communications system operating in an electronic warfare en-
vironment has to be protected from the following threats:
• Jamming-intended to increase the noise level in the receiver, thus ren-
dering the message unintelligible. This can be done with various
techniques-either by 'brute force' through sheer radiated power, or by
'smart jamming' adapting the disturbance to the signal in order to maxi-
mize the effect.
• Exploitation-intended to localize and to identify the source; through traffic
flow analysis it allows the reconstruction of the command chain in a mili-
tary operation; through crypto analysis, it gives access to the information
in the message.
• Deception-intended to transmit signals formally correct but false.
From a theoretical point of view, the interference that a jamming signal J(t)
produces, depends on the amount of its correlation with the desired signal
S(t), as expressed by the cross-correlation factor:
R(t) = Jim
+00
J(t) x S{t - t)c/t
From a practical point of view, the evaluation of a communication system
under jamming conditions is based on the following criteria:
• Jammer Strategy-which options are open to the jammer.
• A theoretical understanding of the performance of the communication
system under jamming conditions.
• System performance under laboratory conditions.
• Characteristics of the transmission channel.
• Jammer power and tactics for a variety of geometrical situations.
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• Jammer-Transmitter design and its effect on the performance of the plat-
form.
• Complexity and cost of various alternative jamming and communication
systems.
1. Jammer Strategy
In any station, the jammer strategy is very much dictated by the com-
munication system parameters and it is a compromise between completely
disrupting communications and the limited tactical and technical capability to
achieve that, as shown in Figure 27.
2. Operational and Tactical Aspects - Jamming Power Considerations
Airborne or shipborne jammers are the primary practical threats
against a naval group operating in the tactical theater. Ground-originated
jamming is not neglected but it is situational. It is difficult to compare these
two types of threat by considering only the advantages and disadvantages,
they appear to have, on a theoretical basis. In a realistic tactical scenario, the
maximum range between ships which have to maintain VHF/UHF communi-
cations is typically somewhere between 15-30 NM. In this scenario, the threat
is much more likely to be from an airborne jammer with its relative unpredict-
ability. Besides, in the case of the shipborne threat, for a variety of obvious
tactical reasons relating to its predictability, VHF/UHF communications can be
maintained by decreasing the above distance quite dramatically. The theore-
tical calculations prove that the attenuation factor determines the distance be-
tween receiver and jammer for maintaining VHF/UHF communications. This is
different in each of the cases of earth and free space propagation. For a free
space path the loss is directly proportional to the square of the propagation
distance:
Llsp = kxR*
If this expression is referenced to 1 NM it will become:




Figure 27. Jamming Strategy: flow chart of a reacting communication system.
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For a smooth earth the loss is directly proportional to the distance at the fourth
power:
Lse = k x R 4
or,
10 x log L se = 10 x log(/c x 1/V/W) + 407og(R/1/VM)
And for a compined sea surface and free space path the loss is:
Lsea = kx R A x e***
where,
e: is the base of Nepper logarithms
or,
10 x log Lssa = 10 x log(/c x 1/V/W) = 40 x log(R/1/VM) + 10xkxRx /ogre
where,
10 x a x /oge = /?
/? = 1 .71 dB/NM
Figure 28 shows this result [Ref. 5: p. 23].
In the case of a shipborne jammer placed at a distance Rj from the in-
tended receiver, and a transmitter placed at a distance Rt from the receiver,
the distance ratio has been found emperically to be related to the jamming
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Rj/Rt: is the distance ratio, and
k: constant factor determining the jamming margin
of the particular system, according to the different
types of modulation, gain of all antennas involved and
the ratio of receiver to jammer bandwidth.
Table 1 provides some results for various distances, from which it can
be seen how important the geographical situation is. This is based on standard
sea surface signal strength attenuation of 1.7 dB/NM and the fourth power law
for a smooth earth: [Ref. 5: p.23].
LdB~ LdB^NM ) = (1.71dB//VM)x(R- 1) + 40 x log(fl/1/VM)
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Table 1. EFFECTIVE POWER OF A SURFACE JAMMER AT VARIOUS DISTANCES
FROM THE RECEIVER







If now the jamming signal comes from an aircraft, the total path loss is
a combination of free space plus sea surface attenuation. Besides, there are
other factors like receiver-transmitter height and power limitations due to their
effect on the airborne platform flexibility that complicate similar calculations.
It has been demonstrated that the total path loss for the V/UHF band airborne
jamming signal is of the order of 150 dB for distances exceeding 54 NM (100
km). Table 2 gives these results for a frequency of 300 MHz. (Based on a
standard distance d
s
of 1 1 .6 NM at 300 MHz, a correction factor A as a function
of the jammer-to-receiver altitude and the combined formula for sea surface
and free space attenuation: LdB = 10 x logk + 40 x logR + /] x R ) [Ref. 7].
As an assumption, there are two aspects that must be taken into ac-
count:
• Complete jamming for all the situations is virtually impossible as it would
require infinite jamming power. The jammer can only limit the range of a
given communications system.
• The jammer is never certain whether it jams effectively or not.
3. Types of Jamming and their Effects
The most usual jamming waveforms that may be encountered by a
spread spectrum system are:
• CW and multitone jammers.
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Table 2. CALCULATED PATH ATTENUATION OF AN AIRBORNE JAMMING SIG-



















41.2 1500 + 123 -11 + 32 144
106 10000 + 130 -19.2 + 38 149.5
213 40000 + 136 -25.3 + 44 156
• pulse jammers.
• broadband and partial band jammers.
• repeat-back (followers) jammers.
A schematic representation of their frequency spectra is given in Figure 29.
In general, if the interfering signal is a CW tone and appears in the
communications channel with an amplitude exceeding a certain level, a sud-
den and total failure of the data-link system will result. This is due to the
"capture effect", peculiar to FM receivers. If the same signal occupies the
center frequency, the critical level may be a few dB below the level of the de-
sired signal, because the latter is always shifted to one side of the receiver
band. This advantage disappears as the jamming signal drifts away from the
center of the channel. Now, in the case of continuous noise jamming,
(Gaussian-its spectrum is spread over the whole channel bandwidth), a similar
threshold effect is also observed, but it is less abrupt on account of the ran-
dom nature of the noise. The effects of CW or Continuous noise are shown in
Figure 30. Statistical results for both these situations are shown in Figure 31.
In the case of digital systems, where pulse transmissions, high bit-error
rate, coded and redundant information and economy in mean power are em-
ployed for maintaining satisfactory performance, two possibilities of jamming














Figure 29. Various Types of Jammers: frequency spectra [Ref. 8: p. 140-141].
first case, the jammer's PRF is exactly equal to the message rate, and the
jamming pulse occupies the same time slots in the message frame. In the latter
one, pulses are transmitted at a rate higher than the message rate, so that at
least one jamming pulse falls in every message, but never at the same place.
Synchronous transmission requires knowledge of the message structure by an
enemy. If the data-link transmission can be received at the location of the










Number of affected bits per message
Figure 30. Vulnerability of a Digital Link: synchronous/non-synchronous CW
and continuous jamming.
itself to trigger off the transmission of a jamming pulse at a suitable time in the
message frame. If at this time a 2-bit pulse of jamming is transmitted on the
mark frequency with sufficient power to exceed the threshold, it will certainly
cause rejection of the message or reception of erroneous information. Another
possibility is a deliberate attempt to mutilate the synchronization pattern of
every message. However, this form of jamming is less efficient because a cer-
tain amount of distortion could be tolerated by the synchronization circuit at
the receiver.
Non-synchronous pulse jamming can be also of CW or noise nature. If
the energy transmitted by the jammer is in the form of a pulsed carrier the
message error rate will rise proportionally with the amplitude of the jamming
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Figure 31. Jamming Effects: results from the introduction of bits of random
polarity in the message.
messages would be higher in the case of pulses 2 or 3 bits long recurring at
the message rate, than in the case of single bit pulses at 2 or 3 times this rate.
If noise pulses are used, the maximum error rates are the same as for a pulsed
carrier jammer, but these values are attained more gradually as shown in
Figure 30.
This again can be explained by consideration of the probability dis-
tribution of the noise envelope. For equal rms values of signal and noise, the
percentage of time that the noise envelope exceeds the signal envelope (30
dB above rms) is 10%. In this case the probability that the information bits
straddled by the jamming pulse lose their signal polarity is therefore (0.1 x 0.5)
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i.e. 5%. This probability approaches 50% only when the peak power of the
noise pulses exceeds the signal power by more than 10 dB (Figure 31).
Therefore, whereas CW and noise are about equally efficient when transmitted
continuously, CW has certainly a distinct advantage in pulse jamming.
Considering now the situation where the jammer faces difficulties in
determining the working frequencies of a data-link system and it cannot set,
as usual, the carrier frequency with accuracy, sufficient enough to disrupt the
receiver, we come to the conclusion of using barrage jamming as a way to
overcome all these. This can be either wide-band jamming, over a fixed part
of the spectrum or swept frequency jamming, by scanning the spectrum. Both
methods require high power, a considerable amount of which is wasted in un-
occupied channels or between channels. In the first case, the power required
to maintain a given power density is several orders of magnitude greater than
for spot jamming . Figure 32 shows that a large number of transmitters would
be needed to cover a part of the V/UHF band (175 MHz wide). A few possible
jamming systems are listed below by way of illustration [Ref. 5: p. 25].
• 175 transmitters each covering 1MHz, with 10 times more power than spot
jammers.
• 18 transmitters each covering 10 MHz, with 100 times more power than
spot jammers.
• 3 transmitters each covering 60 MHz, with 600 times more power than
spot jammers.
Finally, in the last case, of swept frequency jamming, the scanning rate
must be slow enough to ensure that the jamming signal spends a minimum
time of, say 400 msecs, in the centre part of each channel. The scanning rate
is thus given by: 40 kHz(freq deviation)/ 400 msec = 100 MHz/sec. On the
other hand, the repetition rate must at least be equal to the message rate.
Therefore the width of the band scanned by one jammer cannot exceed: 100
MHz/sec x 14 msec = 1.4 MHz (14 msec typical data-link message duration).









Barage Bandwidth ( MHz )
Wideband Jamming: power and equipment requirements.
Thus a total of 125 transmitters would be needed to cover this portion
of the V/UHF band. It must be added that in this case the jamming efficiency
would be that of non-synchronous pulse transmission.
Another type of ECM would be to make use of gaps in the transmission
to trigger off the airborne timing oscillator. This could be done by means of low
level synchronization signals. Once the decoding process is started in the re-
ceiver, it normally has to be carried out until the end of the cycle. Thus a low
powered jammer transmitting short repetitive bursts of false signals (spoofing
by low level signal), would succeed in keeping the receiver decoders in motion
during intervals between messages so that most messages would not be ac-
cepted. To reduce the danger of false synchronization, receivers in the NATO
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Figure 33. Data Link: message format.
ground-to air link (Link 4A), have been provided with double sync circuits.
This procedure ensures that stronger signals are given priority over weaker
ones.
B. SPREAD SPECTRUM SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE UNDER JAMMING
CONDITIONS
1. Direct Sequence Reaction to Interference
The behavior of a DS system with respect to narrow-band and wide-
band interference, and the interference suppression that is achieved in this
way is shown clearly in Figure 35, 36. The whole power contained in the
spread spectrum signal is compressed in the correlator to a signal bandwidth
that is suitable for processing in the subsequent receiver and demodulator. A
narrow-band interference signal, such as CW tone, will, on the other hand, be
spread by the correlator in the same manner as the required signal in the
transmitter, and only a fraction reduced by the value of the spreading factor

























bandwidth of transmitters (. MHz )
Swept Frequency Jamming: efficiency.
this, the interference signal appears at the output of the correlator as a quasi-
noise signal, which means that further processing in the IF circuit will only
cause a reduction of the signal-to noise ratio and will not cause a correlated
interference.
Other wideband signals that are not correlated with the spreading
code, will be further spread in the receiver correlator. This means a far lower
power density is present in the processing bandwidth than what would be the
case with narrow-band interference. Such wide-band interference can, for in-
stance, be a second DS signal having a different code, and this shows that a
large number of DS signals with a differing spread-code can be accommo-
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Figure 35. DS System: behavior in the case of jamming [Ref. 4: p. 172].
tual interference and safety spacings. But by the time the interfering wide band
signal is an almost ideal code sequence with the one used as a code local
reference at the receiver correlator, a high cross-correlation can upset the
sync detector which would then register no difference between the condition
of having interference and having none. Note that the implementation of a
cross-correlation integral is a multiplier with two signal inputs (local reference
plus incoming signal) and an integrator (LPF). the possibilities of high cross-
correlation or no correlation at all are expressed with an output of a maximum
value or zero respectively. Thus from above it is assumed that:
• A high amplitude CW tone used at the centre frequency of DS spectrum
is the most effective jamming signal than any unsynchronized spread
spectrum one [Ref. 9: p. 53].
• A high cross-correlated wide-band code sequence would upset the sync
pattern, where a low cross-correlated one has no effect at all [Ref. 5: p.27].
• A pseudo noise-modulated jamming signal using the same carrier and
chip-rate as the desired direct sequence signal can be most effective,
provided that these two elements can be determined by the jammer.
The bit error probability of a DS system, for a continuous and a pulse
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Figure 36. DS System: decorrelation-demodulation [Ref. 4: p. 173].
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Nj =—— : noise power spectral density,
Eb = —— : signal energy per bit,
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Rb : information rate,
W.
p = -rrr~< = 1: fraction of the spectrum jammedW" v
ss
From the formulas above for the two cases of jamming, the first seems
to say that regardless of the type of jammer, the performance of DS/BPSK is
essentially the same as for the baseline jammer, namely the broadband
Gaussian noise jammer. This is contradicted by the pulse jammer example
from the second one (r: jammer probability on, 1-r: jammer probability off)
[Ref. 8: p. 150].
Figure 37 illustrates the effects of a pulse jammer on a DS/BPSK sys-
tem. There is a big difference between a constant power jammer (p = 1), and a
worst case pulse jammer {p = p'), for an uncoded DS/BPSK system. Note that
for the same fixed average power J. the jammer can do considerably more
harm to an uncoded DS/BPSK system with pulse jamming than with constant
power jamming [Ref. 8: p. 150].
At any rate, a DS system has a given amount of processing gain Gp.
When we try to specify useful jamming margins, it is necessary to know the
type of interference, the interference frequency and the amount of cross-
correlation between that particular interference and code sequence being
used. The performance of the decorrelator, under high jamming conditions for
several types of interferers, has been tested for a particular scenario [Ref. 5:
p. 27]. The results can be quite different for a different scenario, but each time
they illustrate the demodulator's difficult task of differentiating between de-
sired and undesired signals.
2. Frequency Hopping Reaction to Interference
As it has already been mentioned, FH is a jammer evasion strategy,
rather than one which tries to resist or overcome the jammer. So, terms like
jam resistance and jamming-to-signal ratios appear to be irrelevant to FH and
enough to be caught by the jammer.
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Figure 37. DS/BPSK System: behavior under constant power and worst case
pulse jamming [Ref. 8: p. 150-151].
Frequency hopping rate and dwell time are the most significant pa-
rameters in the design of a FH system, in terms of jamming avoidance. The
first one identifies the FH systems as slow, medium and fast. Slow FH is usu-
ally thought of as 100 or 200 hps and fast FH as thousands of hops per second
(khps), while medium FH is somewhere in between.
But it is dwell time that is regarded as the single most important de-
termination of jammer evasion capability. The shorter the dwell time, the
greater is the probability that the system will evade the jammer.
The narrowband or spot noise jammer is not a serious threat to any FH
system-slow or fast, as it would cause an error of 1/n, where n is the number
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of FH channels. This is met when the jammer-receiver scenario provides the
following :
• The jammer frequency has not been deleted from the hopping pattern.
• The jammer has sufficient power to overcome the hopping signal.
Again this would be insignificant if we accept the use of some form of
redundancy in the system (multiple chips per bit of information). And even if
the jammer can change frequency in an effort to increase the probability of
error occurrence, its reaction time is relatively long compared to the dwell
time of even the slow hopper. Barrage jamming (wideband) has been a seri-
ous threat in the past. But the inherent disadvantages of this kind of jammer,
such as high power consumption, reduced platform flexibility and mobility,
high cost in building, operating and maintaining them plus the fact that they
can be easily intercepted and located, made their rise against FH systems al-
most impossible. Besides when only a few such jammers are deployed against
the frequency hoppers, they can be defeated by deleting the jammed band
from the hopping pattern. If a large number of barrage jammers are deployed
so as to produce band saturation jamming, then the FH system cannot defeat
them. But this probability seems more remote to the future, from a practical
standpoint.
The most effective jammer against a frequency hopper, would be the
one capable of meeting at least one of the following criteria: [Ref. 5: p. 28].
• Place sufficient power over the hopping signal power in a large number
of channels (multitone jamming)
• Be able to break the code and follow the hopping pattern.
• Be able to receive the hopped signal, determine its frequency, and re-
transmit a signal calculated to change the effect of the desired signal at
the receiver (follower jammer-transponder).
Both the last two approaches above can be combatted by effective
methods, such as high quality encoding and high hopping rate. Multitone
jamming appears to be the most effective overall threat to any frequency hop-
ping system. Considering the fact that the effectiveness of the repeater
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jammer against FH systems is based on the fast response time, it is assumed
that the jamming energy must reach the enemy receiver before the transmitter
hops to a new frequency. Therefore, the weighting factors for successful com-
munications are: [Ref. 5: p.29].
• The dwell time of the frequency hopper, (driven by the hopping rate).
• The jammer response time.
• The signal propagation time, (governed by the geometrical situation).
For the transponder to cause any jamming at all, the sum of the prop-
agation time from the transmitter to jammer, the jammer response time and
the propagation time from the jammer to receiver, must be less than the
propagation time from the transmitter to receiver plus dwell time (see Figure
38).
Since propagation speed is constant, these times can be easily con-
verted to distances (1 /microsecond = 300m) and ellipses can be constructed
for each link of the net wherein the transmitters and receivers are the loci of
the ellipses. Each ellipse then encloses all points that satisfy the equation de-
scribed above. Therefore, each ellipse encloses the area in which the jammer
must be located to cause any jamming of the target signal. The increase of
hopping rate as a mean of combatting a deliberate interferer follows the con-
cept described above. The desired hopping rate is then greater than
(Tr — Td)~\ where Tr is the total propagation time, and Td is direct path delay.
It can be seen then that the minimum required hopping rate is a function of
distance to the interfering station and the angle of offset from the direct path
(see Figure 38). To give an idea of the magnitude of a possible problem as-
sume that the transmitter and the desired receiver are 10 miles apart and that
the interferer is 8 miles from each of them; Tr - Td = 41 ms and the hopping
rate should be at least 24.2 khps (fast hopping). Then the propagation time
protects the system against selective jamming because of the short dwell time.
Follower jammers using a set-on receiver have also in the future absolutely
no chance to jam efficiently and can only be effective if they intrude into their










Figure 38. Jamming the FH System: repeater-jammer geometry [Ref. 4: p. 39].
parison among a fast-medium-slow hopping system is made in terms of
jammer's geometrical effects on a link that connects two stations 10 NM apart,
and this is shown in Figure 39. With a reaction time of about 20 ms the minor
axis of the ellipse is 6 NM and the major axis 12 NM. The second curve shows
the effect of 24 khps FH under the same conditions. The 500 hps FH is out of
scale. It is a circle with a radius of nearly 200NM. In this example the jammer
has to convert more than 30% of a bit to increase the BER. The Fast FH of 16
khps, hops at least once per each bit of information.
There is certainly a trade-off between fast and slow hoppers in terms
of cost, complexity and capability to face the repeater jammer while not al-
lowing it achievable response time. But given the fact that it can follow, then
the only way to reduce its effects is by using a non-coherent detector. One
approach is to use frequency hopped on-off keying. That is, if a logical 1 is in-
tended, let the transmitter send a signal selected from the library code, if a
logical 0, then the transmitter sends nothing. The repeater jammer then has
no advantage since transmission of a 1 provides a signal for the jammer to
detect and repeat, thus helping the receiver to detect the signal and make the
correct decision that a 1 has been sent. When a is intended the desired sig-
nal transmitter sends nothing, so the jammer can only make a guess at ran-
dom. In this case the jammer probability of causing an error is just J/N. But
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Figure 39. Jamming the FH System: fast-medium-slow hopper geometrical
comparison.
when, in the first case, the jammer sends an identical signal as the desired but
opposite in phase, an incorrect decision may be caused at the receiver.
Finally, FH systems have their limitations too. The processing gain
cannot be extended to infinity, and thus there is an upper limit. This follows
that the hopping rate also has an upper limit, as the code rate is limited. Figure
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40 below gives an illustration of the effects of several types of jammer on an
FH/BFSK system. The detailed analysis is given in [Ref. 8: p. 167-181].
3. Hybrid System Interference Performance
If the jamming power is less than the product of the number of hopping
channels times the average signal power then it is usually advantageous for
the jammer to concentrate its power in part of the hopping band. Assuming a
FH/DS hybrid system, when the power of an interfering signal falls wholly
within this sector, it is spread by only the bandwidth of the DS signal, when-
ever the signal hops into this sector. As a consequence when the actual signal
lies in this part, a narrowband interferer can cause a loss of performance, with
significantly less power than is required to interfere with the entire FH/DS
signal structure.
Thus, for hybrid systems, the jamming margin is not related to the
processing gain as it has been previously mentioned. It can be significantly
less than the simple FH or DS system, although the composite processing gain
will be higher. The reason for emphasizing this possible loss in partial-band
jamming margin is that when the separated direct sequence channels are used
as access channels for multiplexing more than one DS signal on a frequency
hopping carrier, it is possible for a single frequency interfering signal to in-
terfere with only one channel, with no significant effect on the others. To pre-
vent one user (or channel) from being completely lost, while spreading the
effects of interference across all channels, it is necessary to use each channel
periodically, so that each user employs all available frequencies equally. In
that case, even if an interfering signal causes complete loss of one channel,
each of the multiplexed signals would be affected only a part of the time equal
to the ratio:
'Number of jammers/Number of channels'
Thus if a 20-channel system had an interfering signal in one channel, it would
be affected 1/20th of the time, and if all users shared that channel, a particular
user would be affected 1/400th of the time.
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Figure 40. FH/BFSK System: jammer effects [Ref. 8: p. 174].
The bit error probability for a FH/QPSK system and for the worst case
jammer (WCJ) is given by:
BER{WCJ) = Q[J(2x^)]
For a hybrid FH/DS/QPSK system the respective error probabilities for each
of the cases of partial band jamming (PBJ), spread tone jamming which looks
like an equivalent AWGN and for the worst case jamming are:
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^EK,PBJ) = P*QU(2X(/>X^) 8 )]
^b v 8>
PBER(AWGN) = Ql^](2x(pX-jfj ) )]
Pber
[ wcj) = 0[J(2x(^) 8 )]
>j
If one compares the PB£R[WCJ) for both the FH/QPSK and the hybrid FH/DS/QPSK
systems he will conclude that this jammer is less effective against the hybrid
system. See Figure 41. A detailed analysis of this is given in [Ref. 10:
p.291-295],
4. Near/Far Effect and the Inherent Disadvantage of PN Modulation
(Mutual Interference)
The use of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum offers the unique advan-
tage of LPI (Low Probability of Intercept), as this signal appears as a low power
noise and therefore it can be used in covert operations or during periods of
radio silence. It has already been mentioned that this noise-like signal is a
result of bandwidth spreading which is directly proportional to the processing
gain. It has been also mentioned that the processing gain cannot be increased
to infinity. Not only because the technical limitations prevent the respective
increase of the bandwidth or reduction of the information rate, but also be-
cause the receiver can be jammed by a nearby spread-spectrum transmitter,
if the latter exceeds the power level plus the process gain of the wanted signal.
This can happen even though this transmitter is using a different code. This is
called the near/far effect and limits the use of this type of modulation to a link
rather than a net. One way to combat this is by the employment of TH/FH hy-
brid form systems, as has already been mentioned. But this requires exact
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Figure 41. FH/DS/QPSK System: jammer effects [Ref. 10: p. 294].
C. TECHNIQUES AGAINST JAMMING/INTERCEPTION
In general, spread spectrum processing offers the most flexible means of
providing unwanted signal rejection because of its inherent high processing
gain, that does not require any design for rejection of any particular kind of
interference and geographic situation. But it does not, however, offer the best
processing gain for every tactical situation. There are alternatives such as an-
tenna null forming techniques, electronic cancellation, and selective rejection
that can be combined with spread spectrum techniques to produce a compat-
ible system with the advantages of spread spectrum and other signal-to-noise
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improving methods. Antenna-cancellation techniques (adaptive arrays) employ
the directivity of an antenna to reject a would-be jammer. Such techniques
have been used but are not always practical because of positioning re-
strictions. When geometry is fixed, antenna rejection of interference is limited
only by the particular antenna's directivity.
The antenna null forming techniques and their use with the spread spec-
trum receiver are analyzed in [Ref. 11] where a brief explanation of the basic
concept is attempted.
By null forming, a minimum in the pick-up pattern of the antenna can be
directed towards a strong unwanted signal as in Figure 42. Some 20-30 db re-
jection of the unwanted signal is usually achievable. The nulling arrangement
can be added to existing communication links to give them some ECCM pro-
tection, and high rejection of unwanted signals can be achieved. There are
problems, however in making sure that when the wanted signal is stronger
than the jammer it is not rejected itself. No protection against intercept or DF
can be provided, because even if nulling circuits are employed in transmit as
well as receive modes, it is not known where enemy ESM facilities are located.
On the other hand, antenna nulling is completely passive in operation, and the
enemy can have little idea that it is in use. Depending on how the nulling sys-
tem is organized, more or less user skill is required, but in all cases more skill
is required than for the operation of frequency hopping systems. Although a
fully automatic adaptivity is required in today's battlefield with the cost con-
sequently escalating beyond that of frequency hopping, this technique com-
bined with other ECCM techniques renders a fully effective system.
Electronic interference cancellation techniques have been proved more
useful although they are also limited to those situations, in which few interfer-
ing signals occur, (a separate signal simulator and subtractor is required for
each signal), and in which relatively non-complex interfering signals are en-
countered. For effective interference rejection a duplicate of the jamming sig-
nal must be generated through an estimation process. Then this replica is





Figure 42. Adaptive Antenna Radiation Pattern: null forming.
result is an interference free signal. Selective rejectors such as notch filters
are useful for removing interference signals but are limited to narrow-band
signals such as CW. Rejection of a wideband signal with a filter could also
reject much of the desired signal, which would degrade system operation and
give no gain in performance, even though the interference was rejected.
Finally, burst transmission is an ideal way of transmitting short data mes-
sages. It is not suitable for speech because of the relatively large bandwidth
and the increased transmitter power required to transmit speech in short
bursts. This is a very compact or compressed way of transmitting information,
allowing transmission time to be kept short and bandwidth to be minimized. If
messages can be kept short, the enemy is obviously faced with a more difficult
task in detecting that a transmission is taking place. Manual methods of de-
tection are virtually impossible. Provided that operating frequencies are
changed fairly frequently, automatic means of surveillance are also made dif-
ficult unless the enemy is prepared to record virtually all the signals in the
band he is searching, and then to discard the information that is of no interest
to him [Ref. 9: p.60-62].
The processing gains of the various techniques mentioned here are sum-
marized in Table 3 below, for a pictorial comparison [Ref. 4: p. 12].
79
Table 3. COMPARISON OF SEVERAL PROCESSING GAINS PROVIDED FROM
SEVERAL TECHNIQUES
SYSTEM PROCESSING GAIN
Direct Sequence (BWRF )/(RINFO )
Frequency Hopping (BWRF)I(BWINF0 ) = No of channels
Time Hopping 1/Transmit Duty Cycle
Chirp Compression Ratio = rdF
Antenna Rejection Antenna Gain
Electronic Cancellation Depends on the accuracy of replica;
sometimes 40 dB




The design of a complete Communications, Navigation and Identification
(CNI) system through the practical use of spread spectrum technology appears
to provide a solution, meeting the requirements expressed in chapter one.
These requirements can be translated into specifications for a fully integrated
anti-jam tactical communication system.
The development of such a system has been a long lasting effort of the US
Department of Defense for all the services involved in joint tactical operations.
The product of this effort is currently known as the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS), which features pseudorandom frequency hopping
spread spectrum techniques with a low duty cycle signal structure. Originating
from the earlier USAF and USN integrated CNI-AJ communication programs,
it is being evolved to rationalize the link diversity within NATO. Under this joint
effort the US Navy has the leading role in developing the Distributed Time Di-
vision Multiple Access (DTDMA) technology. By making use of all the advan-
tages that the spread spectrum techniques offer, the system provides high
levels of anti-jam performance and security for both digital data and voice
communications, in both the TDMA and DTDMA modes. It also provides pre-
cision ranging, relative navigation and conventional TACAN functions. The
system provides for total system connectivity.
A tri-service, multi-function, multi-channel system such as JTIDS-TDMA
(DTDMA) is the decisive answer to a system architecture suitable to meet the
requirements derived by today's complex operational tactical environment.
For this reason, a JTIDS-based design will be pursued throughout this chapter.
However, certain specifications may be significantly different for smaller-scale
requirements such as those which are suitable in closed-sea operational
areas. Although reduced capacity, power and EMP hardening levels than the
JTIDS baseline standards may be sufficient, cost-effectiveness reasons render
a totally new engineering effort at least uneconomic for the time being, as this
is further explained in the last chapter.
An analysis of a JTIDS-based architectural concept and its operational
characteristics and functions follows next. The concept of DTDMA is then ex-
amined in detail and a description of the system design is given with block
diagrams and pictorial representations. The specifications of the JTIDS-TDMA
(DTDMA) terminals, the system range calculations and the jamming perform-
ance tests are attempted in the following sections. Some of the system de-
ployment considerations are expressed in section 4. Finally the system
survivability issues are given in section 6.
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
1. Choice of frequency operating band.
A JTIDS-based design operates in the Lx portion of the frequency
spectrum (960-1215 MHz),with the frequencies of 1030 and 1090 blocked out
so as not to interfere with IFF. The main reasons behind this selection are:
[Ref. 12: s.29]
• the favorable line of sight propagation characteristics which provide op-
eration up to 300 nautical miles and beyond from high altitude aircraft.
• the existence of important C-N-l functions such as TACAN and IFF. Par-
ticularly, the narrowband TACAN unit included in the JTIDS class 2 ter-
minal shares the antennas with the JTIDS TDMA (DTDMA) signals. But
because of the frequency hopping and spread spectrum techniques em-
ployed in the JTIDS TDMA (DTDMA) signals, the TACAN and JTIDS TDMA
(DTDMA) communications can function simultaneously.
• the low utilization of this portion of the spectrum relative to the lower
congested part of the UHF band makes it very attractive for use.
• the ample bandwidth offered by this portion of spectrum (255MHz).
• the existence of large numbers of subscribers among broad classes of
users.
• the use of already existing hardware for several functions within this band
by a broad class of subscribers supports strongly a time-shared C-N-l
system operating in this portion of the spectrum.
2. System functions.
A JTIDS-based design provides integrated anti-jam communications,
navigation and identification functions (AJ and ICNI), for tactical combat envi-
ronment. More specifically:
a. Security and AJ capability
AJ capability is obtained through the use of pseudorandom, fast
frequency hopping signal processing techniques. These distribute the trans-
mitted data over several hundred Mhz band. Security is obtained through the
use of forward error correction coding (Reed/Solomon) which permits recon-
struction of the information content of messages in which up to 50 percent of
the pulses cannot be interpreted by the receiver.
b. Communications functions
The system provides information distribution of such critical data
as position information on friendly forces, track information on hostiles, threat
warning and control and vectoring information. It also provides digital voice
as supplementary capability and a common frame reference for the relative
navigation function (grid lock).
c. Navigation functions
Precise relative navigation and positioning capabilities are also
provided, based on accurate synchronization to a common system of time and
a signal structure that permits reliable time-of-arrival (TOA) measurements.
The TOA-derived position measurements depend on the source accuracy of
the position identification provided by the transmitting terminals, whether it
be from a highly accurate sattelite Global Positioning System (GPS), an Inertial
Navigation System (INS) or a fixed geographic position. Especially in the case
of a Battle Group and in blue water conditions (out of radar range of land), it
is provided from the position of the flagship. This TOA-derived position esti-
mate is then compared in the JTIDS terminal with other navigation and posi-
tion information sources to provide improved position estimates (up to a 100
feet). This provides a constant frame of reference for the entire group. Practi-
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cally, it eliminates the grid lock and dual track errors currently experienced
using Link 11.
Emulation of the TACAN interrogator function in all tactical aircraft
terminals is also provided.
d. Identification functions
It provides identification of all system platforms through position
and identification data interchange among them and emulation of all the IFF
transponder functions in all system command and tactical platform terminals.
3. TDMA Multi-net operation
Figure 43 shows a typical participation of forces in the JTIDS commu-
nications ring. These forces can be simultaneously serviced based on the
principle of time sharing the same randomly hopped frequencies as other
subscribers within the communications net. To accomplish this a time "cycle"
(or epoch) is established in which time slots are repeated every 12.8 minutes.
The epoch is divided into 98,304 individual time slots of 7.8125 milliseconds
each, thus providing 128 time slots per second for the transmission or recep-
tion of data. The time slot structure is shown is Figure 44.
Each subscriber (terminal) is assigned selected time slots for trans-
mission based on the particular message requirements necessary to support
the mission. It will automatically be able to receive in all time slots that it has
not been assigned to transmit. It may have many transmit time slot assign-
ments, consecutive or spaced, within the epoch. Furthermore, a subscriber
may share other nets by being programmed to transmit or receive in time slots
of numerous other nets, each net functioning in the same time reference and
line-of-sight relayed area but at different frequency hopping schemes. Proper
synchronization is achieved by designating one of the subscribers to serve as
the time reference, by adjusting the crystal oscillator in the various subscriber
terminals to the same time throughout the inter-operating nets. Each sub-
scriber can either broadcast or receive on only one net at a time in any par-
ticular time slot. Typically, more than one subscriber would not be assigned to
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Figure 43. JTIDS Communications Ring: typical participation of forces [Ref.
4: p. 329].
required operational range. In the case where a receiving terminal may be
within the propagation range of more than one terminal transmitting in the
same time slot and net, then the receiving terminal will process only the first
signal received, (being from the closest to it transmitting terminal). Any num-
ber of subscribers can receive in the same time slot of the same net, thus re-
alizing a one-to-one, a group-call, or an all-call capability in selected time
slots. Moreover, subscribers can receive information from time slots while not
transmitting in any slot. This feature permits a subscriber to function in a radio
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Figure 44. JTIDS TDMA: time slot structure [Ref. 13: p. 35-11].
In summary, every subscriber can broadcast data in a commonly ac-
cessible communications data stream, represented by the ring in Figure 43,
above. All other subscribers can receive information by continuously monitor-
ing and sampling the database. Since this is a broadcast system, every sub-
scriber after deciding what category of data he wants, he can receive all the
information the system has at this particular period in that category [Ref. 14:
s.26].
4. Message Standards and System capacity.
A particular message broadcasted into the database may be formatted
or unformatted. The former are intended to replace much of the traffic carried
on UHF voice channels where the latter may accommodate digital voice mes-
sages.
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Perhaps the most applicable message standard for a system like this,
is one that supports both data and voice, relative navigation, identification and
any other information than can be digitized. A JTIDS-based design provides
three basic message structures with different information capacities which can
be matched to the type of information being transmitted. These are shown in
Figure 45. The standard double-pulse structure is the most rugged from a
performance standpoint. Other structures permit the packing of two and four
messages in the time slot through the use of the single-pulse structure and the
deletion of the pseudorandom message start (jitter).
Several processing steps are followed before the system digital infor-
mation signal is transformed into a reliable and jam-resistant form for trans-
mission. The net effect of all these steps is a signal that is spread across a
wider spectrum and is very robust to error detection and correction. The basic
system message corresponds to a time slot of a 7.8125 msec duration. It con-
sists of a block called 'jitter' which is used to vary the actual start of the data
transmission in each time slot. The next two blocks correspond to the sync and
timing data, that determine the transmission of the message. Then the mes-
sage block follows next and the final block is the guard one that allows for the
propagation of the transmitted signal to a range better than 300 nautical miles
without other transmissions causing interference. The guard block has a du-
ration of 4.4585 msecs.
The message block starts with 210 bits. During the first processing step
a polynomial encoding is performed on these bits. As a result, the message
becomes 225 bits, with 15 parity bits added for error detection. In the next
step, the data is spread pseudorandomly with direct sequence modulation.
This is done by mixing 5 bits at a time with a specific sequence of 32 bits
(chips), depending on the pattern of these 5 bits. The sequence has a fre-
quency of 5 Mhz and it lasts for 200 nsecs. This is called cyclic code shift
keying (CCSK) and it results in changing each 5-bit group of data to a 32-chip
symbol of 6.4 pisecs duration. This coincides with the hop transmission time
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Figure 45. JTIDS TDMA Message Structures: slot variations and throughput
capacities [Ref. 15: p. 9].
quency. Another result of this step is that each 32 chip sequence has a
Hamming distance of 16 bits, which means that 16 erroneous bits can occur
before the symbol can be no longer restored [Ref. 16: s.30-3]. The net result
of this step is 45 symbols, each representing 5 bits of the original data. The a
Reed/Solomon error correction code is applied to the symbols, by taking 15
symbols at a time and adding 16 overhead to create a 31 symbol codeword,
that can be corrected if up to 16 of the symbols are changed or lost. The result
of this is 3 codewords of 31 symbols. Then each of these 93 symbols contin-
uously phase shift modulates (CPSM) a different carrier frequency consistent
with the hopping scheme, before transmission. This particular time of RF
modulation provides very little in-band and out of band interference as it gives
a spectral rolloff of 1/f4 [Ref. 16: s.30-2]. The net effect of these steps is that the
message now contains over 100 percent overhead data. Since each message
contains 210 bits of useful information and it lasts for 7.8125 msecs, it follows
that the system throughput is essentially 26.880 Kbps. Table 4 shows the
characteristics concerning the system standards.
In the standard message transmission scheme, double pulses are em-
ployed, whereby two pulses carry the same information (at different frequen-
cies) for more jam resistance, thus the applied data rate is half the maximum
possible. When forward-error correction is applied, the data throughput is
reduced by as much as 50 percent more. The Packed-2 and Packed-4 time slot
structure can be employed to increase throughput capability. The first one
employs the same elements as in the standard structure. However, in Packed-2
redundant information is not transmitted on every two pulses, thus doubling
the data throughput capability over the standard one. In the Packed-4 struc-
ture, the "jitter" time is eliminated and the silent period is reduced, thus dou-
bling the number of data pulses that can be transmitted in the time slot. Also,
like the Packed-2 structure, redundant information is not transmitted on every
two pulses. So the data throughput here is four times that of the standard
structure, with forward-error correction applied.
5. System modes of operation.
The JTIDS is designed to operate in four communication modes, giving
the user the choices of narrow or wide band, secure or non-secure trans-
missions. In mode 1, the signal is secure and provides maximum jam-
resistance through frequency hopping (through its 255 MHz band excluding
1030 and 1090 IFF frequencies). This is a shared band with TACAN frequencies
(up to 128 multiple nets may be created in this mode, limited only by self
jamming when multiple nets are used in the same geographic area) and
pseudorandom noise. This mode provides the most security in a hostile EW
environment. Mode 2 uses a total bandwidth of 10MHz without frequency
hopping. Mode 3 uses identical synchronization in all time slots. And in Mode
4, neither the signal nor the message is encrypted.
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Table 4. SYSTEM TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS
INFORMATION FORM
Bit oriented messages
Digitized voice Continuously Variable Slope Delta
RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
L-band allocation 960 to 1215 Mhz, 153 Mhz band-
width
Frequency hopping channels 51 frequencies spread 3 Mhz apart
RADIO FREQUENCY PULSE
Center frequency hopped over 51 frequencies
Duration 6.4 usees
Bandwidth 3 Mhz
Chips per pulse 32
Chip rate 5 Mhz
Chip modulation CPSM
SYMBOL ENCODING
Pulses per symbol 1 or 2
Bits per pulse 5 bits
Chips per 5 bits 32
Error detection/correction Reed/Solomon (31,15) character
code
Direct sequence spreading cyclic code 32 chips per 5 bits
MULTIPLEXING SCHEME
TDMA or DTDMA 128 slots/sec (7.8125 msec/slot)
6. DTDMA (vs) TDMA architecture.
A JTIDS-based design uses both TDMA and DTDMA techniques. They
both use the same basic JTIDS pulse shown is Figure 46. Their main common
characteristics are:
• Both employ the same signal pulse (6.4 musec), pseudorandom modu-






















Figure 46. JTIDS TDMA/DTDMA: basic pulse [Ref. 17: p.37-6].
• Both provide a secure anti-jam link for data and voice.
• Both use the same crypto (secure) data unit.
• Both operate in the same RF spectrum (960-1215 MHz).
• Both employ the same Reed-Solomon forward error correction code.
• Both can do relative navigation.
The main difference between the two techniques is the way time is used
with each one. JTIDS-TDMA has already been analyzed in the previous
sections. In DTDMA, the low duty cycle pulses are pseudorandomly distrib-
uted in the time-frequency-code (T-F-C) domain. This is shown in Figure 47.
The pulses sync data here for a given message are interleaved in a
pseudorandom pattern with pulses from different messages. In TDMA. the
pulses constituting a particular message are sent together. This extra charac-
teristic of pseudorandom time separation and higher capability in DTDMA is
the principal feature that distinguishes it from conventional TDMA. This ar-
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chitecture provides the flexibility of tailoring the communication requirements
of a particular force to its composition needs. As messages are not con-
strained to any time slot or fixed time duration, they use only the required
portion of the system capacity, permitting system resources to be used and
reallocated in the most efficient manner. This way, high levels of AJ and LPE
performance are practically realized.
The DTDMA channelization and signal structure are based on maxi-
mizing the utility of available ambiguities in time frequency and phase codes.
If all of the LX-band (T/F) space is subdivided into elemental resolution ele-
ments, then they may be formed into specific RF channels which may be ad-
dressed by particular pseudorandom patterns. These then may be used for
specific functions by selected terminals [Ref. 5: p. 20].
DTDMA channel architecture is modular in nature. A general depiction
of this is given in Figure 48. It consists of four basic levels. The basic event
(BE), the basic channel (BC). the function channel (FC) and the metachannel
(MC). The fundamental building block in the T-F-C space is called the basic
event. The pulse transmitted during the BE has a duration similar to the basic
JTIDS-TDMA pulse of 12.8 /usees. The BE is uniquely associated with an event
code that fully describes its signal and channel parameters, such as carrier
frequency, phase code, transmission time e.t.c. These event codes are gen-
erated at a rate of 12.8 /is (78.125 times per second). The BC is the
pseudorandom addressing of one only event per page in the T-F-C domain,
where a "page" is defined as the time duration needed for 512 BE's or 6.55ms
(512 x 12.8 /is). Each BC contains essentially one BE per page, thereby divid-
ing the page over the BCs for transmission.
A contiguous stream of pages forms by definition a metachannel, which
is essentially the totality of all basic channels on any net (1 MC = 512 BCs). The
MC may be viewed as the multiplexing of many T-F-C patterns each with mu-
tually exclusive BEs. A MC has a total of 78.125 different BEs which constitute
512 BCs, and a BC event rate is 152.2 events per second. (78,125/512). Differ-


















Figure 47. JTIDS-DTDMA: T-F-C space representation.
tality of building block channels, which are sets of BCs organized to support
the required numbers of subscribers with a prescribed level of channel ca-
pacity. The specific user functions, which such channels are designed to sup-
port, can include a command and control intercept link like Link-4A, a
surveillance reporting link like Link-11, or a high rate digital voice link, (16
Kbps).
The multi-function CNI requirements of the host platform are generally
met with a number of FCs operating within one MC. There are up to 512 BCs
available on each MC, for use in the composition of FCs. These levels are
depicted pictorially in Figures 49, 50, 51.
The capacity of a MC is 300 Kbps. Specific terminal channel capacities
are tailored to the particular operational needs. The channels are designed to
meet C3 requirements and they are tailored efficiently in terms of access rate
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Figure 48. DTDMA: channel architecture [Ref. 15: p. 6].
grouping (composition of multi-function nets), for specific operationally driven
communication needs.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM DESIGN
The system is essentially designed to operate at four levels. These levels
identify respective terminal classes. While JTIDS has basically four classes of
TDMA (DTDMA) terminals, the proposed system is slightly different. The re-
spective modifications are shown in Table 5 and their specifications are given
in Table 6.
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Figure 49. DTDMA: Basic Channel to Metachannel
Table 5. PROPOSED
TERMINALS
SYSTEM TERMINAL MODIFICATIONS (VS) JTIDS
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A JTIDS based design is drawn from a baseline terminal architecture. This
particular baseline terminal consists of three major parts.
• receiver/transmitter for special processing and conversion.
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Figure 50. DTDMA: Composition of Function Channel [Ref. 17: p. 37-8].
• interface unit to tailor the terminal to the platform being used.
A functional configuration of this design is shown in Figure 52. This design
is essentially the Class 2 baseline for the Tactical Aircraft (FAC) and it also
forms the basis for all the other versions. A different representation of this
baseline design together with both the extended airborne version for the E2-C
and the AWACS aircraft, and the basic shipborne version designed to be in-
stalled on several ships, are shown in Figures 53, 54, 55. The proposed system
is based on the JTIDS class 2 baseline terminal which becomes the system's
basic airborne version for the FAC (Fighter Aircraft). A slightly modified air-
borne version close to the baseline is intended for the MPA. The basic
shipborne version remains the same, but the large ground command version
has such features as the class 1 terminal originally designed for the airborne
C3 centers, such as those in E-2Cs.
The proposed modifications will add little engineering effort and cost since
the JTIDS-baseline terminals are modularized. The basic differences are in the
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Figure 51. DTDMA: Composition of a Multi-function net [Ref. 17: p. 37-9].
Table 6. TERMINALS FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS








Number function channels 64 64 128




TACAN Yes Yes N/A




Number of users 512 512 512
















































Figure 52. Baseline Terminal: functional configuration [Ref. 18: p. 7].
different high power amplifier (HPA) than the one used in the version designed
for the E-2Cs. The cost effectiveness of this modification is further examined in
the last chapter.
1. Receiver/Transmitter (Rx/Tx)
A block diagram of the baseline class 2 terminal with the
receiver/transmitter and the digital processor modules is shown in Figure 56.
It provides the signal processing necessary for the realization of the JTIDS and
TACAN functions. It is basically a multi- function, dual conversion heterodyne
receiver, capable of simultaneous operation on four independent channels. It
can process the spread spectrum continuous phase shift modulated (CPSM)
JTIDS pulses, the conventional TACAN gaussian and the rectangular IFF
pulses too. The JTIDS pulses are provided by the CPSM modulator and up
converter stages. Frequencies are supplied by four frequency synthesizers
which are capable of providing frequencies in increments of 1 MHz across the
whole range of the operating band (255 MHz). Down conversion is done by a
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NAVY CLASS II BASELINE
(FIGHTER AIRCRAFT)
JTIDS





*DDGP:Digital Data Group Processor
*Rx/Tx: Receiver/Transmitter
Figure 53. Navy Class II Baseline: airborne (FAC) version.
quadrature L-band converter which shifts the incoming L-band signal down to
the IF frequency at 70 MHz after being fed with the 280 MHz output of a fre-
quency source module. Channelization is achieved by using four IF amplifiers
with approximately 80 dB gain. Matched filter detection is used for the corre-
lation of the spread spectrum pulses.
The TACAN receiver/synthesizer, power amplifier and processor are
independent from the JTIDS functions. One of the channels is exclusively used
for reception of the TACAN pulses. The same is also done for IFF reception.
The Rx/Tx varies from terminal class to terminal class. The functions of the
Rx/Tx are summarized in Table 7 [Ref. 19: p.38-3].
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JTIDS






*DDGP:DigitaI Data Group Processor
*Rx/Tx: Receiver/Transmitter
Figure 54. Navy Class UN terminal: airborne C3 version (E-2C, E-3A).
a. The Data Processor
This module performs real-time control and signal processing for
the JTIDS message transmission and reception.The whole process is depicted
pictorially in Figure 57 [Ref. 19: p.38-4]. The transmitted data enter the buffer
area at point (1), and then are sent to a Reed-Solomon encoder module for A-J
protection (enhancement), at point (3). The coded data then are sent to the
modulator stage at point (4) where each five bit character is impressed on a
32-chip digital word. Then the data is further processed through the
pseudorandom source at point (5), where two basic functions take place. First,
the data is mixed with an equal number of PR bits by modulo-2 addition (PR

















DDGP: Digital Data Group Processor
*Rx/Tx: Receiver/Transmitter
Figure 55. Navy Class II Terminal: shipborne version.
where it phase modulates the RF carrier at the transmission time. Second, the
PR source provides a PR bit stream to the frequency-time hopping control at
point (7), which then provides a pseudorandom carrier frequency and time-
hopped transmission schedule at point (8). The process results to the gener-











r.Bnr.it ftANtMimi T Daia noaiic*
jricnuM
MOMITOi








































Figure 56. Class 2 Baseline Terminal: functional block diagram [Ref. 18: p. 7].
Table 7. CLASS 2 TX/RX FUNCTIONS
Low noise preamplification
JTIDS and TACAN transmit







Rx/Tx bit status reporting







DEiiorriNC •"• PR BIT STREAM
Figure 57. Digital Data Processor: Tx/Rx signal flow [Ref. 19: p. 38-4].
The transmitted pulses are then remotely received at point (10). An
internally generated PR bit sequence at point (11) serves as a reference to the
time/frequency de-hopping control stage for the de-hopping of the received
pulses at point (12). The de-hopped output is then fed into the data detector
which removes the PR code at point (14) and demodulates the 32 chip data
word. The demodulated 5-bit data character is decoded at point (15), and the
clear data are fed into the buffer area for temporary storage and final routing
to the intended interface (points (17), (18)) [Ref. 19: p.38-3, 38-4].
b. Time schedulingfPR control
A modularized diagram of the digital processor is shown in Figure
58.
Time scheduling is realized by the Schedule Processor, the Time
Ordered Lists, the Terminal Clock, and the Composite Storage Modules. The

































































Figure 58. Signal Processor: modularized diagram [Ref. 19: p. 38-4].
events. These time ordered events are loaded into a Coarse time ordered list
which is a mechanism that maintains proper event order. The events are
stored there properly formatted until they are passed to the Fine time ordered
list for priority routing and final assignment to one of the four receiving chan-
nels or to the transmitter [Ref. 19: p.38-4, 38-5].
PR control is achieved by suitable circuitry that includes functions
such as PR spreading, encryption/decryption and PR control stages. It pro-
vides the necessary PN sequences for the transmitted pulse modulation and
the reference PN sequence for the despreading of both the received pulses
and the required carrier frequencies.
The Transmitter/Receiver (Tx/Rx) control is realized by the Event
Controller, Event Processor and the Reed Solomon Encoder/Decoder Mod-
ules. On transmission, the messages from the data memories are passed by
the Transmit Controller to the R/T unit, suitably screened for conflict avoid-
ance. Similarly, on reception, the Event Controller takes the Time Ordered List
and assigns one of the four available receivers. The received Time of Arrival
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(TOA) is fed back to the Event Controller by the R/T unit. Data and event in-
formation are fed to the processor which then adjusts for any tracking error.
Non-encoded messages are directly passed to the Decryption Control Circui-
try, where encoded messages are passed through the Reed-Solomon encoder
to the Decryption control. TACAN and IFF functions are provided as well [Ref.
19: p.38-5]. The main functions of the DP are summarized in Table 8 [Ref. 12:
p.4].
2. The Interface Unit (IU)
The IU basically provides a standard interface between the host plat-
form and the DP. It performs the necessary transfer of data between the plat-
form and the terminal. It provides channel configuration and mode control, two
way data flow control and data buffering with external interfaces such as LINK
4A, Link 11, TACAN and Relative Navigation systems. It also provides interface
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with the Control and the Display unit. It contains the Network Interface Digital
Computer (NIDC) and the Subscriber Interface Digital Computer (SIDC). The
functions performed by these computers are shown in Figures 59, 60.
A summary of the tactical functions provided by a typical class-2 ter-
minal is given in Table 9 [Ref. 19: p.39-2].
Table 9. JTIDS II TACTICAL TERMINAL FUNCTIONS
DTDMA FUNCTIONS
(1) 16 Kbps direct voice channel
(1) 16 Kbps direct/relay voice channel
Link 4A digital data link
Link 1 1 digital link relay
Relative navigation
Loading rate (Rx:50 Kbps, Tx:40 Kbps)




Round trip time measurement
Capacity (Rx:70 Kbps, Tx:70 Kbps)
Airborne TACAN (Tx/RX, Rx and air-to-air modes)
IFF transponder modes 1, 2, 3/A. C and 4)
C. SYSTEM LINK ANALYSIS
In this section, an effort is made to examine a JTIDS-based design from the
perspective of a communications link between a transmitting and a receiving
terminal. A typical generalized model for this link is shown in Figure 61.
The first step is the calculation of the system baseband bandwidth (B),
which is essentially the information bit rate (Rb), irrespective of the encoding,
spreading and modulating of the baseband signal. As it has already been ex-






























Figure 59. NIPC: functional block diagram [Ref. 18: p. 10].
words in every time slot, out of a total of 128 time slots available in every
second. So,
Rb = (No of words)*(No of bits/word)*(No of time slots/sec) = 28,800 bits/sec
Then, based on the system specifications it is known that the RF bandwidth
is 3 MHz. So, the system processing gain due to the PN spreading can be
subsequently calculated below, as follows:
Processing Gain: GpdB - 10 x \og(3MHz/28.8KHz) = 20A8dB
This parameter is an important feature of the system, and is used for the
jamming margin calculation in the next section.
The bandwidth available for hopping is 237 MHz, as the frequency ranges
from 969 MHz to 1206 MHz. By excluding a total of 84 MHz reserved for IFF
and guard bands, the total usable bandwidth for hopping is 153 MHz. Then the
available number of pseudorandomly hopped channels of 3 MHz each, is 51.
These 51 channels correspond to different carrier frequencies available for the




































Figure 60. SIPC: functional block diagram [Ref. 18: p. 10].
In attempting to set up a model for the system link analysis, the typical
equation used is:
Gt xGr fc x A et x A er




: the carrier frequency used for transmission
G
(
, G r : antenna gains for the Tx/Rt
D: the distance between the Tx and the Rx at which potential
reception is possible
c: the speed of light
L
p
: propagation loss along the transmission path
including free space loss
A
et , A er : effective antenna areas for the Tx/Rx
Assuming the following typical parameters for an air-to-ground link, and
varying the carrier frequency over the entire hopping range, the net effect on
the communication link performance can be calculated as below.
Let:









969 Mhz 1 087.5 Mhz 1206 Mhz
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IFF IFF
Figure 61. Link Model: Tx/Rx link configuration.
• air antenna gain Gr (Tactical Fighter) = dB.
• ground antenna gain Gt= 11 dB.



















The net result is approximately 1 dB improvement in communication per-
formance as the carrier frequency is increased step by step to the upper pos-
sible limit. This effect can be evaluated also in terms of the resultant maximum













x SNR x f2
which is another version of the link equation, where:
K: Boltzman's constant = 1.38 x 10~ 23 J/Kelvin
B: bandwidth available for hopping or bandwidth of the RF
amplifier at the receiver
T: effective system noise temperature in degrees Kelvin




Assuming a tactical air-to-surface link between a tactical fighter and a ship,
and certain typical parameters that are applicable in this case, the net effect
of the carrier frequency variation on the communication range can be calcu-
lated as follows:
• maximum SNR threshold for a digital link= 15 dB.
• Ta = 290 K.
• re= 900 K.








• ignoring attenuation loss. La = dB.
Then, the maximum communication range D becomes:
(a). For Fc= 969 MHz D= 624 Km = 336 nm
(b). For Fc= 1087.5 MHz D= 555.6 Km= 300 nm
(c). For Fc = 1206 MHz D= 501 Km= 270.5 nm
The conclusions drawn from these calculations are:
• There is about 11 percent reduction in the system range as the frequency
is increased from 969 to 1206 MHz (the range is inversely proportional to
the frequency).
• At 969 MHz the maximum achievable communication range of 336 n. miles
appears to be greater than the system's maximum range of 300 n. miles
(beyond line-of-sight).
• no atmospheric attenuation loss was considered here.
• the use of the upper frequency limit (worst case carrier), reduces the av-
erage achievable range by about 11 percent. Since reception of the entire
signal across all the 51 hopping channels is necessary, this can be con-
sidered the most suitable (worst-case) carrier frequency for system con-
figuration and deployment planning.
D. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The system design is such that it provides a high level of connectivity
among the decision making commanders, their scattered sources of surveil-
lance and their weapon systems. Since the system operates in a broadcast
mode, its connectivity implies the use of omnidirectional antennas. Also the
fact that the system operates in the UHF band limits its communication range
to line-of-sight. Therefore, coverage beyond line of sight is practical using re-
lays. This is possible because all terminals can be configured to act in a re-
laying mode. This implies a penalty for the relay unit as its terminal capability
is reduced by half because of the necessity of receiving in one time slot and
transmitting during another.
A typical naval tactical deployment in a closed-sea area of operations may
include a Joint Task Force with the following composition;
• several Guided Missile Destroyers/Frigates with helicopters.
• several attack submarines.
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• several landing and supply ships.
• sufficient air reconnaissance and air-striking support.
• a number of MPAs in a surveillance role.
Obviously the Task Force commander needs total connectivity. To maintain
this level of connectivity, a significant number of tactical voice, data and relay
circuits is required. Moreover, this task force may be spread in transit over an
area as large as 300 n. miles in radius, presenting communication problems
even to the most advanced systems. Many of the tactical circuits are UHF and
this limits them to line of sight distances (15-20 n.m between surface platforms
and 200-300 n.m surface-to-air for approximately 30,000 ft altitude). This is a
severe limitation since dedicated relay units are needed in order to maintain
a satisfactory level of information exchange.
A JTIDS-based design appears to provide extremely high capacity for this
kind of multi-net situation. If all units of the task force are equipped with JTIDS
terminals, then by combining similar functions the big number of tactical cir-
cuits mentioned before will be reduced significantly. Net management then will
be more efficient and all the task-force units can act as relays. Therefore wide
area coverage will be achievable with jam-resistant real-time data transfer in
any tactical situation (LR AAW or SR ASW).
But system line-of-sight range limitations imply the use of an HF net (Link
11-Link 14) or the existence of a dedicated airborne relay for wide area cov-
erage. Although Link 11 is an HF data link ensuring beyond line of sight infor-
mation exchange, it is very vulnerable to enemy's jamming and of limited data
capacity. And the second option of an airborne relay appears not to be very
attractive.
Given the capabilities and the limitations of the system, the task force
commander has to configure his system in the most efficient way in order to
carry out his mission. There are so many different tactical situations that a
unique configuration is not possible. For instance, a surface unit (ship) will
communicate with a Fighter Aircraft through an air communications path,
normally under good weather conditions. On the other hand, a good command
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station will communicate with a surface unit under all weather conditions, over
rough terrain and sea-state conditions.
The efficient configuration is a function of the power settings available and
the type of the antennas used. The commander can operate on these parame-
ters and configure the system in the best way. But there is a third parameter,
attenuation loss along the communication path, which is not adjustable. More
specifically, the attenuation loss per kilometer is more appropriate for consid-
eration since path losses, expressed in decibels, are directly proportional to
the distance in the case of uniform attenuation. Several factors contribute to
this loss, such as weather conditions and terrain (which is mainly a matter of
line of sight and antenna-height placement which affects the degree to which
the communications range is enhanced). Based on these factors, tactical
plans and equipment configurations will depend on the expected system per-
formance.
A system communication range analysis for a variety of different config-
urations and several typical values of La/km encountered in UHF propagation
provides useful information to the commander in determining its most efficient
configuration. Such a generic analysis, for three different types of antennas,
three different power settings and a wide spectrum of possible La/km values,
is performed below.
The particular scenario employs an air (aircraft)-to-surface (ship) commu-
nications link, an air (MPA)-to-ground (command center) communications link
and an air (MPA)-to-surface (ship) surveillance link. Typical antenna gains
used are:
• Gt, Gr= 11dB, for a Ground Command Center.
• Gt, Gr= 7dB, for a ship.
• Gt, Gr= OdB.foran MPA, FAC.
Typical power settings:
• Pt= 1600W, for Ground Command Center.
• Pt= 400W, for an MPA.
• Pt= 200W, for a FAC and a ship.
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• Antenna height and placement.
The methodology used here is based on the formula that gives the link
range:
Pt x Gt x Gr
4xn x Fc V kxTxBxLax SNR
Using the expression of La as a function of distance D for a one way link with
uniform attenuation, we have: [Ref. 20: p. 459].
La = e* xD or {La)dB = ft x D
where,
P = 4.34*
/?: is the specific attenuation in dB/km
D: is range in km
If the uniform attenuation only applied to a fraction of the range D, then that
fraction would be used in the exponent of the equation for La. If the atten-
uation were non-uniform, then La would be calculated by integration. For sim-
plicity, in the following, only the case of uniform attenuation over the entire
range, D, will be considered.
Substituting back to the previous expression we get:
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q = c / Pt x Gt x Gr
4 x n x Fc / fixD
V k x T x B x e 4.34 x S/VR
Then, by substituting the parameters assumed before, we get the final ex-




where, C = — — x
4 x n x Fc (k x Tx B x SNR) 5
And for this substitution there are three cases:
(a). Air-to-surface link (FAC-SHIP)
-/?xD
D = 500 x e 8.68
(b). Air-to-ground link (FAC-COMMAND CENTER)
-pxD
D = 796 x e 8.68
(c). Air-to-ground link (MPA-COMMAND CENTER)
-pxD
D = 1124.64 x e 8.68
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(d). Air-to-suiiace link (MPA-SHIP)
-pxD
D = 709.4 x e 8.68
where,
D is measured in km
All the four curves describing the above cases follow the same declining
pattern. The first case is typically shown in Figure 62. Obviously different
power settings and antenna gains will yield different ranges, but in any case
the same generic curve pattern will result. The exponential reduction in
achievable range becomes apparent as the attenuation is increased from a
line-of-sight, free space, clear-sky path model (0 db/km) to a near-surface path
over rough terrain (0.01 dB/km).
This generic system range analysis applies to any kind of geographic area
of operations, provided that the attenuation loss factor can be precisely
measured. This could then be used by the commander in forming his tactics,
such as units' deployment and spacing. Consequently, this will aid him in es-
tablishing reliable communications, without relying too much on the relay ca-
pability of the system or on HF links.
E. SYSTEM JAMMING CONSIDERATIONS
Considering potential ways of jamming a JTIDS-based system, there are
two possibilities. Barrage or smart jamming. These will be further analyzed in
the following sections.
1. Barrage Jamming
By barrage jamming, the jammer (spaceborne or airborne) is forced to
transmit considerable power in order to cover the huge spectrum of a JTIDS
signal, and to overcome the system's jamming margin. This signal is a hybrid
combination of a pseudorandom (PN), frequency hopping (FH) and time hop-
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Figure 62. Air-to-Surface Tactical Link: range vs specific attenuation.
processing gains of each one of these particular techniques. The combined
system processing gain is therefore the sum of these individual gains. This
margin is expressed by the following equation for a given processing gain Gp,
117
a desired S/N at the output of the receiver demodulator and a particular sys-
tem loss factor Lsys.
Mj = JjS = Gphybrjd -S/N - Lsys
where,
GPhybrid = GPpn x GPfh x GPth
S/N = 15dB maximum desired SNR for a digital link
L 5ys = typically 1 dB
So, based on the theory of chapters 2 and 3 the processing gain of the
system is:
Gphybna{dB) = 20.18 + 17 + 51.9 = 89dB
Which gives:
Mj = J/S = 89 - 15 - 1 = 73dB
This is an extremely large figure for the jammer to overcome before any effect
can be observed on the system's receiver performance, when smart jamming
is intended. When barrage jamming is chosen, the effective system Gp is de-
creased to the figure gained by the spreading and the hopping factor. This Gp
is about 38 dB with a subsequent jamming margin for the system of about 22
dB.
A realistic scenario is two JTIDS-equipped ships trying to communicate
with each other over a JTIDS link at practical distances up to 20 nautical miles
(NM) (line-of-sight), under optimum conditions of no sea-surface attenuation.
Then an airborne jammer, rather than a shipborne one, is regarded as the
most likely threat against the system receiver due to its relative unpredict-
ability and higher jamming distance capability. Also, if this jammer attempts
to operate under optimum conditions (clear skies and no atmospheric losses)
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then based on the assumed parameters given below, the jamming equation
can be set for this case (see Figure 63).
• shipborne antenna gains= 7dB.
• airborne directional jammer antenna = 20dB.
(Pj x Br) x Gjr x Grj x LJr x LJr
JIS =




Pj*Br: total jamming power P r needed to cover the receiver's
bandwidth (Pj: power/Hz, Br: receiver's bandwidth)
Pt: transmitter power
Gjr, Grj: antenna gains along the jammer-to receiver and the
receiver-to-jammer paths
Gtr, Grt: antenna gains along the Tx-Rx and the Rx-Tx paths save
LJr, Lptr : free space losses for the
jammer-receiver
and the Tx-Rx paths
LJr, LJr : propagation loss for the
jammer-receiver and the Tx-Rx paths
(here ignored)
Then, the previous jamming equation can be rewritten:
JlS{dB) = {Pj x Br){dB) + Gjr{dB) + Grj{dB) + Lpjr(dB) - {Pt){dB)
- {Gtr){dB) - {Grt)(dB) - Lptr{dB)
where, The free space loss can be expressed as :
Lp(dB) = (;






Figure 63. Air-to-Surface Jamming: depiction of a typical scenario.
where,
D: distance between the jammer and the receiver or the
Tx-Rx
X\ operating wavelength
The total jamming power required to overcome the receiver jamming
margin, when barrage jamming is intended, can be expressed as a function
of the jammer-to-receiver distance.
J/S{dB) = P T{dB) + 27 + 20 x log -j - 20 x log(4 x n) -
- 20 x logDrj -23 - 14 - 20 x log
-j + 20 x log(4 x n) + 20 x log(37.04)
So,




Drj measured in km
This expression is plotted and shown in Figure 64.
In the case of a shipborne jammer, where the same parameters are
assumed under optimum propagation conditions, (sea surface attenuation is
minimal for both the jammer and the transmitter paths), the same equation
stands. The difference here is that the jammer is subject to the surface line of
sight propagation conditions, which essentially means that it has to be at dis-
tances up to 30 N.M maximum from the intended receiver. This is a severe
disadvantage for the jamming platform since it will be virtually within the re-
ceiver's SSM range. Therefore, the shipborne jammer is not considered as a
likely threat for the system under realistic conditions.
Furthermore, the excessive amount of power required from an airborne
jammer to overcome the system's jamming margin is not practically achieva-
ble, since there are platform limitations and the ranges are unrealistic and
within the receiver ASM range.
2. Smart Jamming
This case includes any possibility, except the 'brute force' technique,
that can be used by a potential jammer to overcome the system's high jam-
ming margin.
One of the targets is the system's synchronization channel. This relates
to that part of the receiver which recovers the carrier and the local sequence.
It includes the carrier local oscillator which is used for phase detection and the
local sequence that is used to de-spread the received signal. Three major
options can be considered here:
• jamming of the local carrier by CW.
• jamming of the local carrier by noise.
• delay lock loop jamming.
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Figure 64. Air-to-Surface Jamming: jamming power vs jammer-to-receiver
distance.
a. Jamming of the local carrier by a CW tone
In general, the carrier recovery for a QPSK transmission is
achieved with phase lock loops. A strong CW interferer may cause problems
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to these circuits resulting in an out of phase and frequency local carrier re-
covery. A CW jammer is spread and it appears at the loop input of the spread
spectrum receiver as noise, thus increasing the RMS tracking error. The con-
figuration of the phase lock loop is shown in Figure 65. A slow change of the
jammer carrier (wj) may cause the VCO to track (wj) instead of the signal car-
rier (wc). The rate of the change of (wj) is a function of the loop filter bandwidth




RC: rate of change in Hz/sec
BL : loop bandwidth in Hz
K: a constant typically less than .5
The loop can track frequency changes within this rate, so the jam-
ming signal should have a sweep rate within this limit. This sweep rate must
be determined by the jammer, and this is only possible if certain design pa-
rameters such as B L are known.
b. Jamming the local carrier by noise
The noise density of the jamming signal affects the RMS tracking
error. This is given by the following formula: [Ref. 22]
RMSerror 2 x CINo
where,
RMS. rr„, : in radians
'error
W: low pass filter bandwidth or the IF bandwidth



















Figure 65. Phase Lock Loop: typical configuration.
The tracking bandwidth B L is a function of the time required for ac-
quisition and the rate of carrier frequency change due to the Doppler effect
caused by the relative Tx-Rx movement. This effect can be expressed by the
following formula:
RELATIVE -VELOCITY
doppier-shm OPERATING - WAVELENGTH
If the relative velocity between the TX and the Rx is 100 km/hr and
the carrier frequency used is 1200 MHz, the resulting frequency shift is 112 Hz.
Then, the minimum required B L must be around .5 KHz wide to compensate for
the positive/negative frequency shifts. Since W is fixed by the information rate
used, the lower the BL the lower the tracking error will be. On the other hand,
the B L cannot go below the minimum specified limit. Also, the B L must be large
enough to allow for fast initial acquisition. The higher the noise power density
of the noise jammer the higher is the resulting tracking error. It follows that
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certain system parameters must be known in advance by the potential jammer
before any effect can be inferred on the tracking error or the required SNR.
c. Delay Lock Loop Jamming
Despreading is achieved by having a local reference at the receiver
for the generation of the PN sequences. This is done by using delay lock loops
(see Figure 66) that help in keeping the local sequence synchronized with the
received signal. When there is no phase difference between the received sig-
nal and the reference voltage Vl(t), then the code loop filter output voltage is
zero and the VCO is set at the normal clock rate. If they are out of phase, an
error voltage will result and a correction is made at the clock rate.
Several ways exist to upset this mechanism such as causing the
delay lock loop to be out of synchronization (track stealing). This again re-
quires prior knowledge of the Rx-jammer geometry and the sequences used.
Also propagation conditions must be known. One option is to adjust the
jammer delay in such a way that the jamming signal is within a chip relative
to the received signal. If the power of the jammer is high enough to overcome
the transmitter's power then the receiver adjusts to the strong jamming. An-
other option is to change the delay at a suitable rate, thus pulling the tracking
loop with the jamming signal and then stop. This leaves the receiver without
a signal, forcing it to search again. Synchronization is not possible if the
jammer repeats this action. This is depicted in Figure 67. Here, T is the time
needed to change the receiver AGC, T is the cycle time, Ao is a fixed delay to
compensate for the propagation and system delay and At is the jamming se-
quence delay affecting the magnitude of the pulling process. The rate of pulling
is given by:
RP = .5 x B 2L
where,
RP: in Hz/sec










































Figure 66. Delay Lock Loop: typical configuration.
The cycle time of pulling (T) can be estimated provided that certain
receiver characteristics such as the B L can be determined by the jammer. The
practicality of this technique depends also on the particular geometric situ-
ation. Because the jamming signal must be within a chip from the real signal,
this means that the jammer must be closer to the intended receiver than the
transmitter, when high chip rates are used. In general, the jammer must be at
a distance Drj:
Drj = c x t
where,








Figure 67. Delay Lock Loop Jamming: pictorial representation.
t : chip duration
For a system chip rate of 5 Mchips/sec the jammer distance is:
3 x in 5
Dri = r = 600 meters, which is unrealistic7
5 x 10°
Also, if the jammer doesn't use the same sequence, its power will be spread
and it will appear as noise to the delay lock loop. This affects the tracking error
as follows: [Ref. 22].
RMS
f^- = JB L x No/(2 x S) x 71 + ((2 x B x No)lS)
where,
B: bandpass filter bandwidth
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S: signal power
Again, the jammer needs to throw more and more power (No) in
order to increase the RMS tracking error. The bandpass filter is fixed by the
information rate and the B L must be at the minimum possible limit to reduce
the noise effects. Since the time to regain synchronization after loosing it is
inversely proportional to B L , the desire is to expand it. Optimality can be
reached when using an adaptive filter which adjusts its bandwidth in accord-
ance with the situation. Again, the jammer needs to determine the required J/S
in order to increase the RMS tracking error. This implies that certain design
parameters are already known.
F. SURVIVABILITY ISSUES
A JTIDS-based design is essentially a nodeless system. Therefore the de-
gree of the system survivability is very high because it doesn't require any
control nodes for its operation. Communications will be maintained even if
only two platforms are left. This design allows for graceful degradation, that is,
the loss of any one platform doesn't affect the level of information distribution
among the remaining platforms significantly. This platform-to-platform
nodeless connectivity enhances the system survivability and it allows commu-
nications reconstructability in the event of several platform losses.
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V. LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
Life cycle costing is a systematic analytical process of determining and
listing the total cost of developing, producing, owning, operating, supporting
and disposing of equipment or complete systems. A major objective of life
cycle costing is to provide decision makers at all levels with sufficient eco-
nomic information to determine the most cost-effective configuration for a
system within budget limitations [Ref. 23: p. 4].
Several items must be considered when evaluating project costs. These
are:
• The cost breakdown structure.
• The Life Cycle Cost (LCC).
• Discount Rate and Learning Curve.
• Risk analysis.
The project work breakdown structure provides a format for identifying and
organizing detailed cost information. The LCC represents the program cost
throughout the life of the project. The discount rate and any existing learning
curves provide correction figures for the time value of money, when analyzing
life cycle costs that occur in different periods, and for cost changes that occur
with production experience. Since there is uncertainty about what costs occur,
when and in what amounts, some method of assigning probabilities to these
costs using risk analysis must also be employed.
The estimation of several cost elements is based on the development of
relevant cost relations which in turn compose a cost model.
A parametric or a statistical Cost Estimating Relation (CER) can be derived
for new systems if there is historical data from prior systems that are func-
tionally similar. Once a CER is derived, it can then be used to estimate the
costs associated with the new system by direct substitution of the various de-
sign parameters and performance specifications into the cost-equation. And
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this can be done for all the alternatives [Ref. 23: p.24]. For example, a typical
cost estimate is derived as follows:
Cost- aX + bY + cZ + ....
Where, X,Y,Z.... : are cost factors (design parameters and performance
specifications) and a, b, c... are CER coefficients based on the analysis of
historical data of the appropriate equipment.
This cost-model is particularly useful during the system design stage
where only mission and performance envelopes are defined.
B. METHODOLOGY FOR LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
The methodology chosen here is the one used for the evaluation of joint
tactical communications program costs (TRI-TAC methodology). This includes
eight steps as shown in Figure 68. These steps are closely followed below for
the actual system cost analysis [Ref. 23: p. 29].
1. Objectives
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if a JTIDS-based system is
an economically acceptable solution when budget limitations exist. In this
sense, it is an effort to evaluate a total system cost figure which in turn can be
used to assist the decision maker in realizing the magnitude of the investment
required for the procurement of a JTIDS- based system in current dollar fig-
ures.
This analysis recognizes that there is no alternative design, available
in the open market, that approaches the effectiveness of a JTIDS-based design
in the area of joint tactical communications systems. The lack of comparable
alternative designs eliminates the possibility of competitive procurement and
precludes a cost-effectiveness analysis of such a system.
Considering these limitations, this analysis aims to reach economic
conclusions that can help in assessing future decisions concerning invest-
ments on such systems.
2. Assumptions
Several assumptions are considered pertinent to this analysis. These


























Figure 68. The LCC Methodology: The eight steps for cost analysis [Ref. 23:
p.30].
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ment of an ideal cost-model for the system given that there are no limitations
in obtaining the actual detailed data required for using this model. The ideal
model is proposed here to demonstrate the actual way of performing the
analysis for this system. The second category of assumptions is considered
necessary because the ideal life cycle cost model has to be modified in this
analysis. This is mainly due to the limited availability of JTIDS-related histor-
ical data below the terminal level, and the confidentiality of detailed informa-
tion about the specific cost elements. These assumptions are stated below:
a. First Category
Approval for official release of the system to specific foreign customers is
assumed here, and the details of this are beyond the scope of this study.
The number of different classes of terminals required for system deploy-
ment is arbitrary but realistic.
The total number of various platforms is arbitrary but realistic (Eighty
total: seventy shipborne and airborne versions and ten ground versions).
The number of sites and bases at which these platforms are deployed is
chosen arbitrarily.
The number of different replaceable items within each terminal is chosen
from existing historical data about similar systems.
The number of support type items is chosen from existing historical data
about similar systems.
The monetary figures (unit prices) are chosen from existing historical data
about similar systems. They are not actual values but they are realistic.
Inflation is ignored.
Salvage cost is assumed to be negligible.
b. Second Category
Operation and Support costs are not considered here due to the absence
of relevant historical data.
Total service time for the system is 20 years.
Aggregate figures for Research and Development (R&D) and Production
costs are based on historical data about systems similar to JTIDS. These
data were provided on a system-terminal basis [Ref. 24 ].
• The R&D costs for the actual system are assumed to constitute either a
fair portion of the JTIDS R&D costs, when the system is procured through
FMS (Foreign Military Sales) channels, or they are assumed to be negli-
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gible when the system is procured by directly contacting the prime man-
ufacturer. The latter also implies the existence of an open competitive
market for such systems. There is a middle case, where R&D costs can
be somewhere in between the previous two alternatives. The extreme
case of procuring a totally new system is not considered, since it is un-
acceptable due to the extraordinary R&D-to-lnvestment cost ratio for a
project with small-scale production requirements.
• The learning curve slope is derived from the commonly acceptable range
of typical slopes for communications and electronic systems. These are
the most frequently used parameters within the cost community. Here the
learning curve slope is chosen to be 92 percent over a period of 6 years
(1988-1993). Production costs after this period are assumed to follow the
actual learning curve observed in the historical data [Ref. 23: p.37].
• The discount rate used is 10 percent which is the current DOD conven-
tional discount rate [Ref. 23: p. 47].
• R&D modification costs for installation on maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs)
are considered to be 3 percent more than the standard airborne version.
There is no difference between the costs of the JTIDS command and con-
trol airborne (E2-Cs) terminal version and the respective ground com-
mand and control terminals for the proposed system.
3. Selection of cost elements and proposed LCC model development
The system's LCC structure breaks down into four aggregate areas
(see Figure 69).
• Research and Development costs.
• Production and Investment costs.
• Operation and support costs (provisional time).
• Salvage costs.
Because salvage costs are considered to be negligible, this area will be elim-
inated from this discussion. The remaining three aggregate areas are further
broken down into fifteen (15) distinct cost elements (CE), that constitute the
System LCC model. These elements together with their respective aggregate
areas are shown in Figure 70. [Ref. 25 J.
This model accepts input from both the customer and the contractor.
The customer inputs include operational and environmental information, the
number of systems that will be online, and the number of hours the system will
operate. The contractor's inputs include the mean time between failure
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Figure 69. The LCC Structure: aggregate areas.
(MBTF), the maintenance cycle of the equipment and the overhaul require-
ments of the system. The three aggregate areas constitute the whole system
LCC for all terminals in all platforms at all sites and bases where the system
is installed.
4. Select/Develop CERs
Each cost element in Figure 70 can be expressed through a parametric
or a statistical CER which in turn may be used to evaluate the actual cost.
These CERs are described and expressed below. These CERs presume that
data is available for the ideal model, thus these CERs reflect the first category
of assumptions. Specific notation used for these expressions is shown in Table
10.
a. Description of CERs for Ideal LCC Model
(1) CE1: Hardware Acquisition. This element refers
to the acquisition cost of primary mission equipment, namely the system ter-
minals and the integration equipment required to interface with the platforms.























Figure 70. The LCC Model: The fifteen system cost elements.
CE1 = YV(/) x UP{I)
save Where,
K(l): number of terminals of class (I) to be installed in all system
platforms of similar type. (Terminal # and class) (Customer)
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Table 10. GENERAL INDEX NOTATION FOR CERS













UP(I): unit price for terminal of class (I). ($/ltem)
(Customer/Contractor)
(2) CE2: Spares Acquisition. This element
consists of the initial investment cost for item spares required to support the
bases and it includes inventory costs at each base. This can be expressed
through a parametric CER :
CE2 = V J" [SB{I,NS) x NB{NS)] x UP (I)
I NS
Where,
SB(I,NS): number of spare items of terminal class (I) to be acquired
for inventory at base NS. (Items) (Customer/Contractor)
NB(NS): total number of platforms deployed at base type NS. (Sites)
(Customer)
(3) CE3: Maintenance Sets. This element re-
fers to the acquisition cost of maintenance sets. These sets are to be used for
on-equipment item maintenance. This can be evaluated through a statistical
CER based on historical data. (Customer/Contractor)
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(4) CE4: Off-Equipment Maintenance. This ele-
ment refers to base-level repairs performed on items which must be removed
from their respective terminals. This includes the labor cost incurred from time
to diagnose, repair or attempt to repair. This can be evaluated through a sta-
tistical CER based on historical data. (Contractor/Customer)
This cost is mainly driven by the monthly failure rate of item
class I in terminal type K at base NS. This is shown with the following CER:




NITEM(I.K): number of items class I in terminal type K in-
stalled on a platform class I. (Contractor)
NPLT(K(I),NS): number of platforms carrying terminals class
I deployed at base type NS. (Customer)
;
APFH(K(I)): average monthly operating hours for platform
carrying terminals of class I. (Customer)
MBTF(I): Mean time between failures for an item class I.
(Hrs) (Contractor)
(5) CE5: Replacement Spares. This element
represents the LCC of terminal replacement items. It includes the costs of re-
pairable items purchased to replace those items which are designated for
discard upon failure and those that are not repairable. This can be also eval-
uated by a statistical CER based on monthly failure rate (see CE4).
(Customer/Contractor)
(6) CE6: On-Equipment Maintenance. This el-
ement refers to the LCC of all work performed on items at their respective
terminals. It can be estimated by a statistical CER driven by the monthly failure
rate (see CE4). (Customer/Contractor)
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(7) CE7: Support Equipment. This refers to the
LCC of system support equipment purchased for each maintenance facility
(base). An additional fraction of the cost is included to allow for the mainte-
nance of the support equipment, including both labor and spare parts, over the
system life cycle. It can be calculated using historical data or through the fol-
lowing parametric equation:
CE1 = ^ ^[NAPB{L,NS)] x UP{L) x (1 + PIUP x AMA{L))
L NS
Where,
NAPB(L,NS): number of support items of class L purchased for base
NS. (Items) (Customer/Contractor)
UP(L): unit price of the item support equipment of class L. ($/ltem)
(Contractor/Customer)
PIUP: Program Inventory Usage Period (operational service life of
the system). (Yrs) (Customer)
AMA(L): average annual portion of the fraction of the acquisition
cost of item support equipment of class L regarded as maintenance cost of this
item over the life cycle. (Decimal Fraction/Yr) (Contractor)
(8) CE8: Initial Training. This refers to the
costs needed for training the initial maintenance and operator/specialist per-
sonnel, and the cost of specific training equipment required for the system. It
can be estimated based on historical data, through a statistical CER.
CE8 = ITEC + IOPC + IBMC
Where,
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ITEC: cost of required training equipment. ($) (Customer/Contractor)
IMPC: cost of initial training for on-equipment maintenance and
operator/specialist personnel. ($) (Customer)
IBMC: cost of initial training for off-equipment maintenance person-
nel. ($) (Contractor/Customer)
(9) CE9: Recurring Training. This refers to the
cost required to train the maintenance and operator/specialist personnel
needed to replace the initially trained personnel who have been transferred,
promoted or have left the armed services. It can be calculated using historical
data. ($/Man/Week or $/Man) (Customer/Contractor)
(10) CE10: Inventory Management. This refers
to the costs required to introduce new assemblies and parts into the customer
inventory system, together with the recurring supply inventory management
costs associated with such inventories. It can be estimated using historical
data. (S/ltem/Yr) (Customer)
(11) CE11: Technical Orders. This refers to the
cost of purchasing the master negatives for technical orders, overhaul manu-
als and other repair documentation. (S/Page) (Contractor/Customer)
(12) CE12: Full Scale Development. This re-
fers to the cost of developing primary mission equipment, support equipment
and associated software. This is an aggregate cost of the basic inputs. It can
be computed both parametrically or statistically.
C£12 = Yj>eVl ( 1 ) + YjXDEV7(K 'H) + Yj YjDEVSE (L 'H ^ + YDEVSYS^ +
/ K H L H H
+ DEVSAL + DEVBMS
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Where,
DEVL(I): development cost for item class I. ($/ltem)
(Customer/Contractor)
DEVT(K,H): dummy variable for development cost for terminal class
K, for hardware (H = 1) or software (H = 0). ($/Terminal) (Customer/Contractor)
DEVSE(LH): dummy variable for development cost for support
equipment item class L, for hardware (H = 1) or software (H = 0). (S/Support
Item) (Customer/Contractor)
DEVSYS(H): development cost not related to the terminals. ($/Sys-
tem) (Customer/Contractor)
DESVAL: cost of engineering design and validation of the system.
($) (Contractor)
DEVBMS: development cost of maintenance sets. ($) (Contractor)
(13) CE13: Platform Integration. This refers to
the cost needed to develop the integration hardware and software required to
interface the system terminals to existing platform equipment. It can be calcu-




DEVL(I): development cost associated with those items that are
used as an interface between some terminals and some platform. ($/ltem)
(Customer/Contractor)
(14) CE14: Platform Installation. This refers to
the cost of installing terminal and integration items, together with the cost to
purchase items classified as racks, cables, and similar equipment. It can be
estimated or calculated both statistically or parametrically.
140
C£14 =V 2_[WT{I) x CERSTS{NP) x DLR + UP{I) x NINSTL] x
/ NS NP
V V/V/7£M(/,K,A/P) x MPS{NS,NP,ICM) x N8(NS)
K /CM
Where.
WT(I): item weight. (Lbs) (Contractor)
CERSTS(NP): man hours per pound to install an item in platform
type NP. (Man-Hrs/Lb) (Customer/Contractor)
DLR: labor rate. (S/Man-Hr) (Customer/Contractor)
UP(I): average unit cost of racks, cables and similar equipment. ($)
(Contractor)
NINSTL: number of installation items required per item ($) (Con-
tractor)
NITEM(LK.NP): quantity of items type I in terminal class K installed
in platform of type NP (Items) (Contractor/Customer)
MPS(NS,NP,ICM): number of platforms of type NP that are located
at site NS and utilized by command ICM. (Platforms) (Customer)
NB(NS): total number of sites of type NS (Sites) (Customer)
(15) CE15: Software Maintenance. This refers
to the cost required to support all system associated software, both in termi-
nals and in the host computers at the platforms in which the system is in-
stalled. It can be estimated using historical data. ($) (Customer/Contractor)
b. Modified Cost Model
The previously derived LCC model can be used provided that data
is available. But the lack of detailed historical data led to the use of a modified
cost model that closely follows the second category of assumptions made in
the beginning of this chapter.
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On the basis of the previously analyzed cost elements, the work
break-down structure and the aggregate figures available for these terminal
versions, two of the major cost elements have been calculated using the fol-
lowing relations: [Ref. 24 ].
Research, Development and Evaluation (RDE):
RDE(t) = RFSD + RPU + RG iH + R TEV
Where,
RFSD : contract actuals on full scale development
RPU : platform integration historical costs
Rgih ' government-in-house historical RDE costs
R TEV : test and evaluation historical costs
Data for these elements was actually provided in the following form:
RDE{t) = RfSDlPME + RPU + RTEV + RlLSjENG
Where,
Rfsdpme '• cos * °f FSD °f prime mission equipment
RILSENC : Development cost for engineering effort, logistics and sup-
port.
Production and Investment (I):
HO =W + IgIH + IIS + '/LS + ^CP + 'a/S
Where,
lHW : FSD hardware adjusted for production
Igih '• government-in-house (12% of hardware costs)
/
;s
: initial spares cost equivalent to hardware
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IILS : initial logistics & support cost (11% of flyaway)
lECP : 5% of hardware spares
lINS : installation costs (for Aircraft: 5%, for ships: 20% of hardware)
Data for these elements was actually provided in the following
form:
'(0 - We + jGIH + !ILS
Where,
lPMB : production cost for prime mission equipment
5. Collect Data
A matrix approach has been used to organize the cot data for these two
cost elements. The process is illustrated in Tables 11 and 12 [Ref. 26: p.23-33
and 36-37].
Table 11. SYSTEM RDE COST ESTIMATE FOR 792 TERMINALS ($M)
COST ELEMENT FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 TOTAL
FSD PME 23.13 40.71 49.15 37.13 21.40 22.89 194.3
Platform
Integration
39.21 60.63 70.43 58.80 31.54 33.07 293.68
Test and
Evaluation
22.27 22.57 26.78 27.41 27.71 48.10 174.87
System Eng.
and ILS
16.80 23.56 29.70 23.30 21.65 50.06 165.16
RDE TOTAL 101.41 147.33 176.14 146.66 102.68 154.15 828.37
The figures for platform integration include a 3% increase for the
modification needed for the MPA terminal. No further changes have been in-
corporated here since all the other terminal versions follow the JTIDS-based
design figures.
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Table 12. SYSTEM PRODUCTION COST ESTIMATE FOR 792 TERMINALS ($M)
COST ELEMENT FY88




The installation and production costs (Table 12) include related figures
for the airborne versions (FAC and MPA), and the shipborne and ground ver-
sions as well.
The aggregate LCC can be computed from the following relationship:
LCC = 1
(1 +r) 1
x [(R(t) + l{t) + S{t) + Salvage)]
Where,
r: discount rate
R(t): aggregate R&D costs during time t
l(t): aggregate investment and production costs during time t
S(t): aggregate support costs during time t
According to the assumptions listed earlier, cost data has been col-
lected for R(t) and l(t). S(t) and salvage value have been ignored. The data has
been provided by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and reflect JTIDS cost
figures. Furthermore, the cost data should be discounted to account for the
time value of money and procurement costs should be adjusted for learning
effects.
The rationale behind discounting is the fact that there is a time prefer-
ence in consumption such that a present monetary unit is worth more than a
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future monetary unit. Then it follows that procurement of that unit in the pres-
ent represents a greater expenditure value than procurement of it in the future.
Consequently, discounting should be considered when adding together dol-
lars spent or received in different periods, because they have different values
The problem then lies in the proper choice of the discount rate. Ideally,
in a market economy, if there weren't any taxes or other kinds of distortions,
there would be a unique discount rate and this would be the market rate of
interest which would be the same as the consumer rate of interest. Since this
is not the case, the discount rate should optimally reflect the ratio of consumer
willingness to consume today versus the willingness to consume tomorrow.
This optimality is determined at the point where the production possibility
frontier curve and the social indifference curve are tangent to one another.
This then becomes the social rate of time preference. But since this is some-
thing that cannot easily measured, several approximations have been sug-
gested. The opportunity cost rate, that normally reflects a government's
opportunity cost of capital appears to be a good approximation for a proper
discount rate [Ret. 27 ]. But for the purpose of this analysis, and given that
data for the exact measurement of this is not available, a 10% discount rate is
used. This is the official discount rate for evaluating U.S government projects
[Ref. 28 ]. However, when evaluating time costs, the analyst must keep in mind
these lines, for a proper and accurate estimation [Ref. 23: p.47-49]. (Note that
all costs have been expressed in real terms so corrections for inflation are
unnecessary).
The cost also needs to be corrected using existing learning curves.
The learning curve correction is based on historical evidence that as the total
quantity of units increases, the manhours or cost to produce this quantity de-
creases by some constant rate. The common measure of the learning slope is
expressed as the ratio of change in cost when the quantity is doubled. Figure
71 shows the typical learning curve [Ref. 23: p.37-43] and [Ref. 29 ].
The cumulative average aggregate investment (production) cost {AVIN )
of N items is given by the following formula:
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Cost
Number of units produced
Figure 71. Typical Learning Curve: exponential decline.
AVIN = A xN B
Where,
N: number of units produced in production lot
A: theoretical cost of first unit in production lot




The investment (production) cost of the individual N th unit from a par-
ticular lot of units ordered is given below:
/N = 4x[W' +s>-((N-1)< ,+e >)]
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Then the total investment (production) cost TIN of the lot can be ex-
pressed as:
TIN = A x (A/""8 ')
The production cost data in this analysis has been adjusted for learn-
ing curve effects based on the procurement plan shown in Table 13.
Table 13. SYSTEM TERMINAL PROCUREMENT PLAN
TERMINALS FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 TOTAL
Ground 1 1 2 2 2 8
Ground Trainers 1 1 2
Fighter AC 4 4 4 4 4 20
FAC Trainer 1 1 2
MPA 2 2 2 2 2 10
MPA Trainer 1 1 2
Ships 6 7 7 7 6 33
Ship Trainer 1 2 3
Grand Total 80
6. Estimate Element Costs
a. RDE Costs
Based on the assumptions made for the RD&E cost, we get three
different cost estimates as below:
(1) Case 1: Procurement through FMS. In this case the RDE
cost is a function of the number of terminals ordered by the U.S, the number
of terminals ordered by all non U.S countries, and the number of terminals
ordered by the customer under consideration. The allocation of the RDE cost
is based on an algorithm which splits it into a 'fair' proportion for each coun-
try. This algorithm, as shown below, is a pure averaging formula:
RDEFMS




X: number of terminals ordered by the U.S
Y: number of terminals ordered by non U.S countries
N: number of terminals ordered by the particular country
Using the historical data from Table 12 and a discount rate of
10 percent, the discounted R&D cost for seven hundred ninety two (792)
JTIDS-based terminals is:
R(t)
RDE = / — = 597.23$M
•(1+'') f
Then by applying the 'fair' proportion algorithm in allocating R&D costs
through FMS, the actual system's RDE cost for eighty (80) terminals becomes:
RDEFMS = (
597_23
) x 80 = 34.82SM
Where, X= 792, Y= 500 + 80, N= 80, for a total lot of 1372
terminals.
(It is assumed that the U.S. has ordered 792 terminals and
that 500 terminals have been ordered by other non U.S countries prior to the
order placed by the country under consideration).
(2) Case2: Procurement through the Prime Manufacturer and
indirect use of Economic Aid tied to FMS. Here the RDE cost is assumed to
be 5% of the total RDE cost incurred for the development of the 792 JTIDS U.S
terminals. This slightly lower figure reflects the use of part of the economic aid
provided to the country under consideration and tied to FMS, to offset a por-
tion of the RDE costs allocated to that country. The resulting figure is:
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RDEFM5PM = 5 % of RDE = 29.86SM
(3) Case3: Procurement through the direct contact with the
Prime Manufacturer. In this case the RD&E costs are zero, assuming a per-
fectly competitive market for the particular system.
RDEPM =
b. Production and Investment Costs
For production costs, the data were adjusted for a learning curve
slope correction, based on the previous analysis and the relevant assump-
tions. The adjustment was made as follows:
log.92
B =
, o = --12log2
682
792
AVIN = J^ =r = .86SM
iAV N ) 86
A =- — =
-^r=1.91$M
(A/ s ) .448
/ 1292 = 1.91 x [(1292 38 ) - (1291 88)] = 70S/W
/1372
= 1.91 x [(1372 88 ) — (1371 88 )] = 70$M
7/ 1292 = .70 x (1292 88) = 386.49$M
7/ 1372 = 70 x (1372 88 ) = 407.48S/W
Tlso = T/,372 - 771292 = 20.99$M
(4V/80 ) = -^-==.262$M
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Production cost data has already been discounted, so no further adjustment
is required.
c. Total System Cost Figures
The cost figures for the proposed system, discounted and adjusted
for learning effects are shown in Table 14. These calculations have been per-
formed assuming a JTIDS-based design.
Table 14. SYSTEM AGGREGATE COST ESTIMATE FOR 80 TERMINALS, DIS-
COUNTED AND ADJUSTED FOR LEARNING EFFECTS ($M)
PROCUREMENT
METHOD
TOTAL PROJECT COST AVERAGE
COST/TERMINAL
FMS 34.82 + 20.99 = 55.81 .697
FMS & Prime
Manufacturer
29.86 + 20.99 = 50.85 .635
Prime Manufacturer 20.99 .262
7. Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented previously are based on historical cost figures,
a particular discount rate and a specific learning curve slope. Consequently,
there are three sources of uncertainty associated with the previous analysis.
The first is uncertainty about the cost figures used, because these are not the
actual but rather historical costs expected to reflect the actual costs [Ref. 25 ].
Second is the subjective choice of a discount rate, and third is the use of an
estimated learning curve slope. Sensitivity analysis is appropriate to under-
stand the impact of these uncertainties on the LCC estimates.
Concerning the cost data, it is more meaningful to assign probabilities
of attainment to them rather than only comparing their central tendency val-
ues. This probabilistic cost analysis helps in evaluating the degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding a most probable cost value. In this case, the system cost
elements are not assigned specific values but rather they are characterized
by their cost probability distributions. This method requires the determination
of these probability densities.
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Concerning the discount rate and the learning curve slope, it is impor-
tant to determine the degree of cost sensitivity (or no sensitivity) when these
two correction factors vary over a wide range of values. This analysis is per-
formed and explained in the following sections.
a. Sensitivity analysis for the cost figures
This is based on two assumptions:
• The use of the triangular distribution for the various cost elements is the
most pertinent since it requires the least amount of information for a
meaningful description of cost estimation. It requires only three parame-
ters for each cost; the minimum possible cost (a), the maximum possible
cost (b) and the most probable cost (m). This is shown in Figure 72 [Ref.
26 p.39-42].
• Actual costs are assumed to range between 20% above and 5% below the
most probable cost (m). which in this case represents the JTIDS historical
figures. Normally the most probable cost (m) is the average of the maxi-
mum possible cost estimate (b) and the minimum cost estimate (a) over
the range of possible values that can be obtained [Ref. 26 p.39-42].
Based on these assumptions, the expected value E(c,) and the var-
iance V{c,) for the ith cost element can be computed by using the following for-
mulas:
r , , . 1 , r ,
(m 2 x (2m - 3a) + a 3 ) (m 2 x (2m - 3b) + b 3 )
£ (c,-) = ( ,- ,.—-rr ) x [( —— ) + (
——
)]










Figure 72. Cost Estimation Description: triangular cost probability distrib-
ution.






















PME -1.15 + 4.62 23.13 21 98 27.75 24.2
Platform
Integration
-1.96 + 7.84 39.21 37.24 47.04 40.85
Test and
Evaluation
-1.11 + 4.45 22.27 21.16 26.72 23.24
System Eng
and ILS





Basically five more tables of the same nature have been analyzed
for the whole period (1988-1993). The risk assessment for the aggregate RDE
cost estimate and range determination is shown in Table 16 below.
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FY88 -5.07 + 20.28 101.41 96.34 121.69 106.48 8.36
FY89 -7.36 + 29.46 147.33 139.97 176.79 154.93 15.49
FY90 -8.8 + 35.22 176.14 167.34 211.36 184.92 17.5
FY91 -7.33 + 29.33 146.66 139.33 175.99 153.95 13.73
FY92 -5.13 + 20.53 102.687 97.55 123.217 107.8 4.25
FY93 -7.7 + 30.83 154.15 146.45 184.98 161.76 11.16
By the central limit theorem we have that the sum of mutually in-
dependent random variables with a common distribution will be asymptotically
normally distributed with a mean and variance of :
E(c) = ZE(c,)
V{c) = V£(c:) - [E(c,)Y
/=1
So the overall range for each year is:
Range:[E{c) - 2c, E{c) + 2a]
The results are given in Tables 17 and 18 for both the RDE and the
production costs below:
And after discounting with a factor of 10 percent the RDE cost range
becomes:
RDE cost range ($M): (522.8, 730.86)
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Table 17. TOTAL RDE COST ESTIMATE RANGE DETERMINATION FOR 792
TERMINALS ($M)













Also, the overall range for the production cost is:
Production cost range ($M): = (516.09, 916.09).

























PME -24.85 + 99.4 497 472.15 596.4 521.8
Government
in-House
-4.3 + 17.2 86 81.7 103.2 90.28





The figures then are converted to reflect the actual costs for a non
U.S. purchase of 80 terminals by applying the same methodology as in section
6. That is, by using the 'fair' algorithm and a discount rate of 10% for both
upper and lower limit RDE costs, and a slope factor of 92% for learning effects
correction of the production costs for both upper and lower limits too. These
are essentially the upper and lower limits of the cost ranges of uncertainty for
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each procurement case. The total cost estimated range for the three alterna-
tive procurement routes is shown in Table 19 below.
Table 19. SYSTEM TOTAL COST ESTIMATED RANGE FOR 80 TERMINALS ($M)
ALTERNATIVES RANGE
Total Cost through FMS (46.33. 70.96)






b. Sensitivity analysis for the discount rate
This part of the analysis aims to discover the degree of cost sensi-
tivity with respect to the discount rate variations, over a range of assumed
values. It must be noted that only RDE cost variations are analyzed because
the historical production cost figures are already discounted. The results for
792 terminals are shown in Table 20.
Table 20. MEAN RDE COST VARIATIONS RELATIVE TO VARIOUS DISCOUNT









869.84 783.7 733.47 633.8 542.85 500.44 475.06
The figures then are converted to reflect the actual costs for a non
U.S. purchase of eighty (80) terminals. Mean RDE cost, mean production cost
and mean total cost values are reported in Table 21 for each procurement
case. It must be noted that the third case of procurement, through the direct
contact of prime manufacturer, corresponds to the mean production cost
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Table 21. MEAN COST VARIATIONS RELATIVE TO VARIOUS DISCOUNT RATES




































22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08 22.08
value, because the RDE costs in this case are zero. This production cost value
appears constant because it was already historically discounted.
c. Sensitivity analysis for the learning curve slope
The most typical slopes for electronic and communication systems
are within the range from 80 to 99 percent [Ref. 23: p.37]. It must be noted that
slope variations will only affect the production costs. The results of such an
analysis are shown in Table 22.
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Table 22. MEAN COST VARIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS SLOPE FAC-
TORS FOR 80 TERMINALS ($M)
SLOPE
FACTORS
























2.79 5.94 10.72 22.08 39.61 57
d. Combined sensitivity analysis
The effect on total cost behavior as a consequence of the RDE cost
variations with respect to several discount rates and a fixed slope factor of 92
percent, for each of the three alternative routes of procurement, is shown in
Figures 73, 74, 75. The respective effect due to the slope factor variations and
a fixed discount rate of 10 percent is also shown in the same figures for the
same three cases of procurement. Finally, these figures show the effect of cost
uncertainty. In a sense, they present the overlapping effect on the total cost
of all kinds of parameter variations. This composite effect is essentially re-
presented pictorially by an overall area of uncertainty.
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•8. Results
The following conclusions are drawn from this LCC analysis.
A system procurement based on the JTIDS technology and design will be
most reasonable if there is a possibility to directly contact the prime
manufacturers, provided that such a route is feasible. The feasibility of
such an alternative depends on the degree of existing competition in the
open market and the inherent barriers of technology transfer. This pro-
curement procedure would minimize the R&D-to-investment ratio.
A design based on the JTIDS-concept and technology may exceed the
requirements necessary for smaller scale systems to be used in different
environments. This might encourage the decision maker to set specifica-
tions for a totally original design, with less capacity transmitting power,
hardware interfaces and nuclear hardening of the terminals used. Al-
though production costs may normally decrease exponentially with these
parameters, this option is regarded as not affordable for the time being.
Because there isn't yet any competition in the open market for such a
system with fully integrated C3 anti-jam tactical communication capabili-
ties, the R&D costs would by far exceed the most unfavorable JTIDS fig-
ures. In fact JTIDS is the first of its kind.
• Procurement of such a system late in the future is consistent with the
technological capabilities of the potential threat, and the prospects of an
open competitive market. It also follows the mathematical realities for a
cheaper design since the production costs normally drop and the dis-
counting process is cumulative. Furthermore, original R&D costs may
have already been fully allocated. In joint procurements such as JTIDS,
the later the customer joins the project the lower are the R&D costs allo-
cated to him. But there is a trade-off in delaying the purchase. There are
opportunity costs that customers incur due to the delay in acquiring the
new technology and taking advantage of the relevant benefits. The deci-
sion maker must evaluate the costs and benefits before he makes his final
decision.
• A life cycle cost analysis is only objective and realistic if the figures used
are objective and realistic. The projection of communication systems
costs is heavily based upon historical data from previous similar engi-
neering efforts. This is particularly relevant in this case where the system
is a first-of-a-kind system. The decision maker must carefully examine and
analyze the accuracy of such figures. Moreover, he must justify the dis-
count rates and the learning curve slope factors. Results can be easily
skewed when arbitrary slope factors, subjective discount rates and mis-
leading historical data is used.
• It is up to the decision makers to choose one of the possible three alter-
native cases for this system's procurement. This decision, of course, is
dependent on all the situational assumptions mentioned before. Whatever




































Figure 73. Total Cost Behavior (Case 1: FMS): overall area of uncertainty.
assumptions are carefully weighed. After weighing these factors, the
choice should lie with that alternative which provides an acceptable cost
with the highest probability. Although the most likely cost may be higher
than the cost of another alternative, it may still be preferred if the lower
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Figure 75. Total Cost Behavior (Case 3: PM): Overall area of uncertainty.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Effective coordination of all forces involved in joint tactical naval oper-
ations in closed-sea areas can be achieved through real-time, survivable, se-
cure and high capacity communications. A joint tactical digital communication
link can fulfill these requirements and it can provide interoperable solutions to
assist the Naval Commander in the command, control and communications
(C3) process.
A conceptual design based on the Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS) provides real-time, high capacity (up to 300 kbps), multi-
function (up to 128), multi-net (up to 16) voice and data communications
through the use of time division/distributed time division multiple access
(TDMA/DTDMA) technology. Functions such as Link 11, Link 4A, Relative
Navigation, Precise Positioning (up to 100 ft), IFF (identification of friendly and
foe) and tactical air navigation (TACAN) are also provided. TDMA trans-
mission takes place during fixed assigned time slots. By permitting variable
time slots, DTDMA improves the system efficiency, since every potential sta-
tion uses only the necessary portion of the total system capacity. Both modes
allow many users simultaneous access to the link. System effective throughput
is limited by the use of forward error correcting and detecting schemes.
The system gracefully degrades due to its non-nodal connectivity nature;
consequently, its survivability is enhanced to a degree that communications
are maintained in the event of several system platform losses. It is also very
resistant to enemy jamming and electronic support measures (ESM) activity
due to the use of spread spectrum technology. Although costly, this technol-
ogy is very effective against enemy electronic counter-measures (ECM) and
ESM activity, under current realities, as it provides high anti-jam system mar-
gins and low probability of intercept (LPI) levels. Furthermore, the system is
very secure due to the employment of advanced message coding schemes.
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Jamming analysis shows that the jammer has to operate from practically un-
realistic distances in order to jam the system effectively, when barrage jam-
ming is intended. Geometrical situations are nearly always such that the
jammer is at a severe disadvantage compared to a desired transmitter as far
as the path attenuation factors are concerned. Increased jamming power could
overcome the inherent system high AJ margin and the path attenuation, but it
might also affect the jamming platform's flexibility. Theoretical results show
that barrage jamming by an airborne or a shipborne conventional jammer
against this system is not possible from realistic distances. Although the need
for the use of omnidirectional antennas by the system makes it more suscep-
tible to highly directional jamming, this is not a serious problem. The lack of
antenna null-forming capability is offset by the high system processing gain.
Airborne jamming has an advantage over shipborne jamming due to the rela-
tive unpredictability of the jammer. However, it is not effective because of
platform power-carrying limitations, the high system AJ margin and the com-
bined attenuation factors encountered along the jamming path. In fact, the
jammer will always be within the system's receiver air-to-surface missile
(ASM) range due to the inherent high processing gains provided by the hybrid
spread spectrum modulation and the coding techniques employed by the sys-
tem. Furthermore, shipborne barrage jamming is not possible against this
system because the jammer platform will also be within the system's platform
surface-to-surface missile (SSM) range, even if higher jamming power can be
put out by this kind of jammer.
Smart jamming is another option in attempting to jam this system effec-
tively but it requires fast and smart repeaters with high jamming power output.
An effective alternative might be to jam the synchronization circuit of the sys-
tem. This option requires prior knowledge of certain system parameters be-
fore any action is taken by the potential jammer. In any case, the
cost-effectiveness of building a smart jammer for this system is certainly
questionable and it is probably an area of further research. On the other hand,
a JTIDS-based design should not be viewed as an unjammable, cure-all sys-
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tern for all the problems that may be encountered. However, the jammer can
be presented with such problems that its task becomes practically difficult and
expensive.
System link analysis calculations show that air-to-ground communication
ranges are satisfactory under realistic environmental conditions (up to 300
NM). Surface-to-surface ranges are essentially line-of-sight (up to 20 NM) for
a UHF system like this. This is a major flaw for the system because the longer
command, control and communications (C3) paths normally required for joint
tactical operations should be served either by relays or by using existing HF
data links (Link 11, Link 4A, Link 14). But these links have inherent disadvan-
tages such as jamming susceptibility, slow data rates and dual tracking errors,
and the use of relays does not appear to be a very attractive solution. This is
because continuous availability of relays is not feasible for smaller scale na-
vies even if certain solutions such as the use of conventional maritime patrol
aircraft (MPAs) are employed. The conventional MPA, with its limited effective
operating time and range, presents availability problems even if the modifica-
tion cost and engineering effort for the respective terminal are not an issue.
The choice of the Lx portion of the UHF band for system operation is based
on its relatively low utilization, the favorable air-to-ground line-of-sight char-
acteristics, and the compatibility with existing hardware serving other func-
tions such as IFF and TACAN. Given these advantages, and the range
disadvantages mentioned before, it is believed that future C3 systems with
comparable technology and beyond line-of-sight ranges (without relays) must
be an area of potential research.
Deployment analysis and planning should consider ways to identify the
most efficient system configuration. Configuration depends on certain system
parameters, such as power settings, antennas, and the impact that the envi-
ronmental and operating terrain element has on the attenuation loss to be
used. Maximum achievable ranges with the worst case conditions can then be
calculated and used in the decision making process by the Naval Commander.
Spatial deployment separation must be considered as well, due to the "near-
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far" effect. Closely spaced units can operate with high power output when the
employment of hybrid spread spectrum techniques is based on accurate syn-
chronization. Also, code division multiple access (CDMA) guarantees the
avoidance of mutual interference of closely spaced system-equipped units
when perfectly uncorrelated PN coding schemes are employed.
Affordability for such a system is questionable for smaller navies due to
the lack of competition in the related area, for the time being. Although the
capacity, the power and EMP hardening levels of a JTIDS-based design by far
exceeds the respective levels required by smaller scale navies, the high
R&D-to-lnvestment ratio renders an original design uneconomic for the time
being. The procurement of a totally new system in the future is consistent with
the technological capabilities of the threat and the lower production costs due
to the learning effects. With all options present, procurement of such a system
directly through the prime manufacturer appears to be the cheapest route,
because it minimizes the associated R&D-to-lnvestment ratio. Acquisition of a
JTIDS-based system through official routes appears a preferable solution for
the long-term future. R&D cost allocations for joint projects follow a declining
pattern, being proportional to the number of prior potential system customers.
In any case, the decision maker should evaluate the trade-offs between a pur-
chase delay and a timely acquisition of the new technology in such a way that
opportunity costs won't be incurred. Furthermore, when a life cycle cost
analysis is performed, the discount rate and learning curve slope factors, as
well as the historical cost figures, must be carefully examined and justified
using sensitivity analysis. Otherwise, a false decision might be reached.
JTIDS is not still fully operational and it has a development window of
about 15 years. This may lead to a situation where the technology employed
by the system will no longer be state-of-the-art after it is fully tested and de-
ployed. A 10-year-old anti-jam (AJ) margin performance requirement may be
meaningless as the threat develops new ECM capabilities.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the overall analysis attempted in this study the following are re-
commended as areas for further research:
• The conceptual design of a repeater jammer capable of attacking a highly
(AJ) system like the proposed one.
• The conceptual design of a 'smart' jammer capable of attacking the syn-
chronization circuit of the system.
• And, the examination of the design feasibility of an HF AJ system capable
of providing long-range high capacity communications as compared to the
line-of-sight ranges achievable by the proposed system.
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